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INTRODUCTION 
 
San Francisco is the home of the platform economy.
1
 Uber and 
Airbnb—the poster children of that economy—launched their initial products 
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1
 See PETER C. EVANS & ANNABELLE GAWER, CTR. FOR GLOB. ENTER., THE RISE OF THE 
PLATFORM ENTERPRISE: A GLOBAL SURVEY 11 (2016), https://thecge.net/wp-
 




in the city and used the feedback garnered from Bay Area users to perfect 
their business models.
2
 These and other platform companies also started to 
build their loyal user bases with Bay Area consumers.
3
 But, if San Francisco 
nurtured Uber and Airbnb,
4
 New York helped them grow.
5
 Based on news 
stories of what was happening in San Francisco and New York, the tech 
                                                                                                                               
content/uploads/2016/01/PDF-WEB-Platform-Survey_01_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HAC-
J2Z8] (“The highest concentration of platform headquarters is found in the San Francisco Bay 
Area.”); see also The Online Platform Economy: Who Earns the Most?, JP MORGAN CHASE 
INST. (May 5, 2016) https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/insight-online-
platform-econ-earnings.htm [https://perma.cc/MC6A-EFT2] (“West Coast cities are the 
epicenter of the Online Platform Economy, with San Francisco topping the charts.”).  
2
 See There’s an App for That, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news
/briefing/21637355-freelance-workers-available-moments-notice-will-reshape-nature-compan
ies-and [https://perma.cc/7JHY-JHR3]; Biz Carson, How Three Guys Turned Renting an Air 
Mattress in Their Apartment into a $25 Billion Company, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2016, 11:22 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-airbnb-was-founded-a-visual-history-2016-2 
[https://perma.cc/9BWS-J3MN] (describing Airbnb’s initial launch as 
airbedandbreakfast.com in San Francisco). 
3
 BRAD STONE, THE UPSTARTS: HOW UBER, AIRBNB, AND THE KILLER COMPANIES OF THE 
NEW SILICON VALLEY ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 107–24 (2017) (describing Uber’s growth 
in San Francisco); LEIGH GALLAGHER, THE AIRBNB STORY: HOW THREE ORDINARY GUYS 
DISRUPTED AN INDUSTRY, MADE BILLIONS . . . AND CREATED PLENTY OF CONTROVERSY 8–23 
(2017); cf. Ryan Lawler, On-Demand Delivery Startup Postmates Raises $16 Million from 
Spark Capital, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 18, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/18/postmates-
16m-spark-capital/ [https://perma.cc/PW3P-VY8Z] (noting that Postmates launched in San 
Francisco and has grown in subsequent markets).  
4
 The availability and value of the tech community in San Francisco as a source of early 
adopters to give feedback on a new product or service is recognized by many entrepreneurs. 
See, e.g., Morgan Brown, Uber—What’s Fueling Uber’s Growth Engine?, GROWTHHACKERS 
(2013), https://growthhackers.com/growth-studies/uber [https://perma.cc/E3EN-6BJF] (“Uber 
knew that launching in San Francisco meant that they would be interacting regularly with the 
tech community who are continually looking for new tools and services that improve their 
quality of life.”). 
5
 Airbnb found users for its services in New York in 2008, and quickly realized better 
photographs of listed properties were essential to attract bookings. See GALLAGHER, supra 
note 3, at 27; see also Jenna Wortham, With a Startup Company, a Ride Is Just a Tap of an 
App Away, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/technology/04rid
e.html [https://nyti.ms/2qjdWaI] (“New York is a different beast than San Francisco when it 
comes to public transportation, and in much of the city there is often no shortage of ways to 
get around.”). 




community and others nationwide began to catch wind of the disruption that 
was heading their way.
6
 
This disruption would not just involve new products and services 
affecting existing businesses. It would also serve as notice of the regulatory 
challenges that followed the entry of Uber and Airbnb into each new market. 
Government officials in California and the state of New York made national 
headlines as they struggled to apply existing consumer protections and 
licensing fees to these innovative services.
7
 In many ways, the states of 
California and New York and the cities of San Francisco and New York 
became crucibles for the development of regulatory policies to govern 
companies such as Uber and Airbnb. These solutions were often used as 
templates in other jurisdictions.
8
 Nevertheless, it has been anything but a 
smooth process for government officials, entrepreneurs, or consumers. 
                                                 
6
 See, e.g., Michael Arrington, Huge Vote of Confidence: Uber Raises $11 Million from 
Benchmark Capital, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2011), https://techcrunch.com/2011/02/14/huge-
vote-of-confidence-uber-raises-11-million-from-benchmark-capital/ [https://perma.cc/53ML-
J5AE] (describing Uber’s innovation and post-money valuation of $60 million within eight 
months of initial launch in San Francisco); Scott Austin, Airbnb: From Y Combinator to 
$112M Funding in Three Years, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2011), https://blogs.wsj.com/ventureca
pital/2011/07/25/airbnb-from-y-combinator-to-112m-funding-in-three-years/ 
[https://perma.cc/V2JL-FMQF] (describing the growth of Airbnb after being accepted into Y 
Combinator). 
7
 See Anthony Ha, California Regulator Passes First Ridesharing Rules, a Big Win for Lyft, 
Sidecar, and Uber, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 19, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/09/19/cpuc-
ridesharing-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/JCN8-VHT5]; see also Vauhini Vara, Uber, Lyft, 
and Liability, NEW YORKER (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/u
ber-lyft-liability [https://perma.cc/S54Q-A8DC] (noting liability concerns for both Uber and 
Airbnb); cf. Ryan Lawler, Airbnb Will Begin Collecting Transient Occupancy Taxes for San 
Francisco Bookings Next Month, TECHCRUNCH, (Sept. 17, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/201
4/09/17/airbnb-sf-occupancy-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/KWF7-NXVE].  
8
 See Emma Hinchliffe, No Vacancy: How Airbnb’s New York City Problem Is Just Getting 
Worse, MASHABLE, http://mashable.com/2017/04/03/airbnb-nyc-no-vacancy/#Zbv5o8QcFPq
h [https://perma.cc/T7EH-VW4J] (“[O]ther cities that are growing in dissatisfaction with the 
company’s rapid takeover are watching for tips on how to fight their own battles.”); see also 
Tomio Geron, California Becomes First State to Regulate 
Ridesharing Services Lyft, Sidecar, UberX, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/california-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-ridesharing-services-
lyft-sidecar-uberx/#75f3f51b1804 [https://perma.cc/F2LN-YEMW] (discussing California’s 
rules and their potential as a model for other states). 




Headlines about the ongoing battles fill news feeds even now, almost 10 years 
after Uber and Airbnb were founded.
9
 
This article begins by examining how the different characteristics and 
cultures of Silicon Valley and City Hall set the scene for the confrontations to 
come. With that context in mind, we dive into the specifics of the battles 
between Uber and Airbnb on one side and California and New York 
regulators on the other. Those specifics help to illuminate why and how the 
current regulatory system is ill equipped to achieve its goals—consumer 
safety, competitive fairness, and nondiscrimination, among others
10
—while 
also supporting innovation and technological change.  
These regulatory struggles have harmed everyone involved. 
Consumers have not been fully protected as they try out platform company 
services; regulators and policymakers have spent untold hours and 
government funds attempting to enforce existing regulations; and Uber and 
Airbnb have paid huge fees, penalties, and litigation costs as their battles have 
moved to the courts.
11
 Moreover, society in general is harmed as important 




                                                 
9
 Winnie Hu, As Uber Woos More Drivers, Taxis Hit Back, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 18, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/nyregion/nyc-taxi-center-uber.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2nDhhQD]; Megan Rose Dickey, Airbnb Settles Lawsuit with San Francisco, 
TECHCRUNCH, (May 1, 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/01/airbnb-settles-lawsuit-with-
san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/LJ4V-NPSV].  
10
 See, About the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
http://cpuc.ca.gov/aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/C7ZS-7QBX]; see also N.Y.C. Taxi and Limo 
Comm’n, About TLC, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/about.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/SQ82-2X67]; S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.2. (2017).  
11
 Heather Kelly, Uber’s Never-ending Stream of Lawsuits, CNN (Aug. 11, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/technology/uber-lawsuits/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/A2ZW-3MM3]. In 2016, Airbnb filed a number of lawsuits in federal court 
to head off restrictive rules issued by local regulators after the company refused to cooperate 
with prior laws. See text, infra at Part II, Section A(2). In San Francisco, Airbnb has had to 
accept criminal liability if it fails to comply with city short-term rental laws. S.F. ADMIN. 
CODE § 41A.5.e (2017).  
12
 In 2014, the Supreme Court ruled against television show streaming company Aereo in a 
decision that ultimately led to its bankruptcy. Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files 
for Bankruptcy,  N.Y.  TIMES  (Nov.  21,  2014),  https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/busin
ess/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy.html [https://nyti.ms/2my0gGZ]. Digital health companies with 
mobile native apps that track user consumption and activity face a number of regulatory 
hurdles. See Samuel Waxman et al., Legal Health Isn’t Easy for Digital Health 
Companies, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 13, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/13/legal-good-
 




These issues are not new. Regulatory history is replete with examples 
of innovative businesses in high demand by consumers—think railroads, 
telephone, and airlines
13
—that regulators took “command” of to ensure 
consumer safety and prevent price gouging and other unfair business 
practices. After decades of use, many of these regulations failed to function 
effectively as business and society changed. In response, all these industries 
were ultimately deregulated, creating another set of problems. Is there no 
other path for innovative, high-growth businesses other than strictly regulated 
or unregulated? In this article, we posit that there is. 
In Part I, we discuss how regulators and platform companies arrived at 
this point of tension. In Part II, we detail how regulators’ attempts to control 
Uber and Airbnb resulted in harm to both sides. In Part III, we suggest a better 
way to regulate innovative companies. 
We know that new disruptive technologies are just around the corner 
whether they are autonomous vehicles, smart contracts on blockchain 
platforms, ambient artificial intelligence systems in our homes and cars, or 
something yet to be envisioned. How do we prepare to regulate technology we 
do not really understand yet? We argue that this can be achieved by creating a 
collaborative, flexible, nimble process of regulation that involves all industry 
and regulatory stakeholders. In current models of regulation, this is not 
                                                                                                                               
health-isnt-easy-for-digital-health-companies/ [https://perma.cc/JBG3-TAVZ]. The SEC has 
made a number of fintech founders nervous by opening up new conversations on regulation. 
See Nik Milanovic, An Obscure Regulatory Debate Has Put the Entire U.S. Fintech 




 Although not widely known to be the beginning of the American administrative state, the 
steamboat industry was the first large-scale American industry to be regulated at the local, 
then state, and then national level. Intense competition along the Mississippi River led to 
reckless steamboat driving and fatal steam engine explosions along the busy trade route. As a 
result, The Steamboat Act of 1837 was written to protect consumers and consumer goods. The 
1837 Act relied on private enforcement mechanisms. It was followed up by the Steamboat Act 
of 1853, which removed the private enforcement mechanisms and applied administrative 
adjudications such as fines or the revocation of a license. Railroads went through a similar 
regulatory path. Economic downturns, safety concerns, and a need for regulatory continuity 
between states led Congress to enact the Interstate Commerce Act, which gave Congress the 
right to regulate interstate railroads to protect consumers and facilitate healthy competition. 
See Reuel Schiller, The Historical Origins of American Regulatory Exceptionalism, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY 
PROCESS 55–70 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016). 






 but in Part III, we explore whether there is a way to create a 
different regulatory process by utilizing principles of design thinking, a 
method that has proven its worth in product design, system design, and 
infrastructure design, and is now making its way into the processes of 
government.
15
 We provide an understanding of design thinking in general and 
then detail the steps involved to create a new regulatory process using design 
thinking.
16
 By putting such a regulatory process in place, consumers and 
innovative businesses will know that both society’s best interests and 
innovation will be supported regardless of when the next disruption appears. 
                                                 
14
 Many regulatory processes include a notice and comment period during which businesses 
and members of the public can suggest changes to proposed rules. See OFFICE OF THE 
FED. REGISTER, GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, https://www.federalregister.gov/uploa
ds/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSR9-CMJ3] (describing how 
comments are solicited from the public and how those comments are used by agencies to issue 
final rules); CAL OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW, GUIDE TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE 
REGULATORY PROCESS, https://www.oal.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2017/05/How-2-
Participate-102016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UWS-8XPZ] (describing the notice and comment 
process in California). 
15
 See generally Christian Bason, Design-Led Innovation in Government, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV. 16 (Spring 2013), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/design_led_innovation_in_
government [https://perma.cc/67RN-CVHM] (discussing both private industry and public 
agencies adopting design thinking for public purposes); GLOB. CTR. FOR PUB. SERV. 




 Design thinking has already been utilized to recommend changes to governmental systems 
in Canada, Denmark, and other countries around the world. See JOERI VAN DEN STEENHOVEN 
ET AL., SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES: REDESIGNING REGULATION FOR THE SHARING ECONOMY 
(2016), https://www.marsdd.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MSL-Sharing-Economy-
Public-Design-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/62B9-9D35] (using design thinking principles to 
rethink regulation for the City of Toronto); Bason, supra note 15, at 16 (“In Denmark, design 
has already been applied in a wide range of public sector settings”); June Gwee, Redesigning 
Employment Pass Application in Singapore, THIS IS DESIGN THINKING (June 15, 2015), 
http://thisisdesignthinking.net/tag/government [https://perma.cc/G398-P3N3] (“Design 
thinking can potentially transform the perception and meaning of public service.”). 








The rulemaking procedures for the federal government and the state of 
California have been in place since the mid-1940s.
18
 They were designed to 
work well with a business models that are different from those used by many 
platform companies today. For that reason, there is inherent tension between 
existing rules and the models used by platform companies to offer services in 
new ways. 
 
A. The Culture of Regulation  
 
Regulations have not always kept up in times of rapid change.
19
 This 
inability to adapt quickly can be traced to the increasing complexity of 
regulation and the changing perspectives and theories concerning the goals of 
regulation that drove that complexity throughout its history.
20
 
The history of regulation in the United States is most often traced back 
to the rules promulgated in the second half of the nineteenth century by the 
                                                 
17
 We would like to thank all the participants in the ReWIRE Events hosted by UC Hastings 
and the Office of Kamala Harris, California Attorney General in 2016. ReWIRE was attended 
by both former and current regulators and entrepreneurs at new and established companies in 
the platform economy, and was designed as a deep dive into the issues that are at the forefront 
of this paper. In order to allow for full and frank discussions, we promised all participants we 
would not quote or attribute anything directly, which we have not done. Nevertheless, many 
of our arguments were inspired by their terrific insights and detailed discussions of the 
impasse.  
18
 Cynthia Tripi, Administrative Law, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 729, 729 (1987); John G. 
Clarkson, The History of the California Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HASTINGS L. J. 237, 
247 (1964). 
19
 ANDREW LO, ADAPTIVE MARKETS: FINANCIAL EVOLUTION AT THE SPEED OF THOUGHT 372 
(2017) (“The U.S. legal system is a working example of adaptive regulation. . . . [I]t 
incrementally changes in response to societal needs and political pressure. However, it wasn’t 
designed for periods of rapid change.”); see also Stephen J. Groseclose, Reinventing the 
Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions on an Empirical Study of EPA’s Clean Air Act Rulemaking 
Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 522 (1994) (“Chronic regulatory delay and 
unrealistic Agenda information are symptoms of complex problems in the regulatory 
bureaucracy.”). 
20
 Cf. ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND 
PRACTICE 66–67 (1999) (explaining that “[a]s the field of regulation has grown and matured, 
so has the discussion regarding theory” and demonstrating the varying emphases of different 
theories of regulation). 






 At that time, public officials recognized that the 
government had to protect merchants and farmers from the exorbitant rates 
they were charged by railroad companies to ship goods across the country.
22
 
Eventually, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
23
 which 




More laws and regulations followed in the next several decades as the 
federal government exerted its power to control more industries.
25
 Additional 
agencies and regulations followed throughout the first two-thirds of the 
twentieth century. These included new consumer protection regulations in the 
1900s and 1910s,
26
 as well as New Deal regulations in the 1930s.
27
 
Environmental protections, civil rights, and reduction of poverty policies all 
grew during the 1960s.
28
 At the same time, state governments were also 
                                                 
21
 See Schiller, supra note 13, at 55–70. More recently, legal scholars and historians have 
argued that there have been state and local rules since the United States was formed, and that 
those rules were the beginning of regulation in the United States. See William J. Novak, A 
Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 28–30 (including citations to works referenced) 
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds., 2013). 
22
 See A Brief History of Administrative Government, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, 
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461 [https://perma.cc/A7VG-PXQ7]. 
23
 See Interstate Commerce Act (1887), OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, https://www.ourdocuments.go
v/doc.php?flash=false&doc=49 [https://perma.cc/7FRZ-NNAA].  
24
 See Andrew Glass, Congress Approves Interstate Commerce Act, Feb. 4, 1887, POLITICO 
(Feb. 4, 2016 12:08 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/congress-approves-
interstate-commerce-act-feb-4-1887-218485 [https://perma.cc/6UKG-V8VH]. 
25
 See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 13 (2012) 
(discussing the construction of the national administrative state in the United States). 
26
 See Our History, FED TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history 
[https://perma.cc/92EL-5MZT] (noting that the FTC was created in 1914 and has the mission 
to protect consumers and promote competition); Part I: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its 
Enforcement, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. [https://perma.cc/7UMP-7KXU], 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm. 
27
 Cf. Martin Kelly, Top 10 New Deal Programs of the 1930s, THOUGHTCO 
https://www.thoughtco.com/top-new-deal-programs-104687 [https://perma.cc/A55Q-UPPT]. 
28
 See Mary O. Furner, From “State Interference” to the “Return of the Market”: The 
Rhetoric of Economic Regulation from the Old Gilded Age to the New, in GOVERNMENT AND 
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION, 131 (Edward J. Balliesen & David A. 
Moss eds., 2010). 




issuing rules in areas not covered by federal regulation.
29
 Following these 
decades of rulemaking, the 1980s and 1990s saw a wave of deregulation.
30
 




Command-and-Control regulations are mandatory rules formulated by 
government officials and imposed on a targeted industry.
32
 These sorts of 
rules were seen as necessary because of the impact externalities had on the 
efficiency of unfettered free markets.
33
 However, this authoritarian, top-down 
method came under criticism in the 1970’s
34
—a period during which the 
number and specificity of regulations exploded.
35
 Theorists began to 
recognize that regulations did not always accomplish their goal of controlling 
                                                 
29
 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role 
in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 93, 97–98 (2004) (explaining 
that before the Federal Government enacted any widespread environmental regulation, states 
regulated businesses to protect clean air and water supplies). 
30
 See Edward Balleisen & David A. Moss, Introduction to GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: 
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 1 (Edward Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2009). 
For an analysis of the response of legal scholars to these developments, see Alice Armitage, 
Gauguin, Darwin & Design Thinking: A Solution to the Impasse between Innovation and 








 Wendell Pritchett, Types of Regulation, REG. REV. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.theregrevie
w.org/2016/04/05/pritchett-types-of-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/HU9Y-NVJZ] (“Under 
[command-and-control regulation], the regulatory agency sets forth methods, materials, and 
the processes by which the regulated entity must operate.”). 
33
 See Balleisen & Moss, supra note 30, at 2 (noting that in the 1950s and 1960s, regulators 
were understood to be on a “search and destroy mission, with market failure as the target”); 
cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation, in 
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 13, 15–16 (Edward 
Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2009) (analyzing Adam Smith’s theory of free markets and 
concluding that “the theory that markets, by themselves, lead to efficient outcomes has, in 
short, no theoretical justifications”). 
34
 Furner, supra note 28, at 133–34. 
35
 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Why We Still Don’t Have Flying Cars, U.S.A. TODAY (May 12, 
2016, 12:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/05/12/technological-
progress-stagnation-regulatory-explosion-1970s-column/84225066/ [https://perma.cc/HRP3-
JTG7] (“1970 marks what scholars of administrative law (like me) call the ‘regulatory 
explosion.’”). 






 in part because of what would come to be known as the theory 
of regulatory capture. 
The term regulatory capture was the label given to the concepts first 
described by George Stigler in the early 1970s.
37
 Stigler posited that “every 
industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will 
seek to control entry” and that “regulatory policy will often be so fashioned as 
to retard the rate of growth of new firms.”
38
 In other words, the status quo is 
protected by the regulations themselves, as it is difficult and often expensive 
for new companies to comply with complicated rules.
39
 
These theories of “government failure” led to a call for widespread 
deregulation.
40
 These reforms, however, did not often change state and local 
                                                 
36
 Cf. Balleisen & Moss, supra note 30, at 2–3 (“By the late 1970s, social scientists had begun 
. . . showing increasing sensitivity to the possibility that even in the presence of market failure 
policymakers could potentially do more harm than good in their attempts to cure market 
ills.”); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce Commission: 
The Tortuous Path From Regulation to Deregulation of America’s Infrastructure, 95 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2012) (“[J]ust as market failure had given rise to economic regulation, 
regulatory failure gave rise to deregulation.”). 
37
 Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 203–
04 (2006); see generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 1, 3 (1971).  
38
 Stigler, supra note 37, at 5. Stigler’s original notion of regulatory capture has been 
expanded to include more nuanced analyses of how capture can occur. See generally James 
Kwak, Collateral Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 
71, 80–90 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (noting three mechanisms by 
which regulated industry is able to shape regulators beliefs and actions: (1) identity, (2) status, 
and (3) relationships). 
39
 See David A Moss & Daniel Carpenter, Conclusion: A Focus on Evidence and Prevention, 
in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 451, 451–52 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss 
eds., 2014) (describing the original definition of regulatory capture as envisioning powerful 
incumbent firms paying regulators to build barriers to entry). 
40
 See Marc Allen Eisner, Markets in the Shadow of the State: An Reappraisal of 
Deregulation and Implications for Future Research, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: 
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 512, 512–13 (Edward Balleisen & David A. Moss 
eds., 2009) (describing how theories of regulatory capture and criticism of regulation in 
general helped create a foundation for wide-ranging moves to deregulate markets). 
Deregulation, however, did not always achieve the desired results. See Dempsey, supra note 
36, at 1152. The worldwide financial crisis that began in 2008 resulted in a call for the return 
of regulation to many industries, especially the banks. See Balleisen & Moss, supra note 30, 
at 1. 








In addition to the lack of incentives for change created by regulatory 
capture at the state and local level,
42
 other forces make new regulations 
difficult to implement. First, the rulemaking process is lengthy and 
cumbersome, and the process of revision even more so.
43
 Second, although an 
agency may begin a rulemaking process on its own initiative, in practice, the 
regulatory process is primarily reactive. Regulators tend to wait for a statutory 
mandate, a suggestion from other government official or agency, or a petition 
from an outside person before initiating the process to change an existing rule 
or write a new one.
44
  
The result is that, even now, in the digital age, the state and local 
rulemaking process is slow and deliberative, waiting for changes in the 
marketplace to create demand for regulatory changes.
45
 For example, San 
                                                 
41
 See John Cassidy, Battle of the Bike Lanes, NEW YORKER (Mar. 8, 2011), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/battle-of-the-bike-lanes 
[https://perma.cc/Y54Y-466G]; cf. Larry Downes, Lessons from Uber: Why Innovation and 
Regulation Don’t Mix, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/201
3/02/06/lessons-from-uber-why-innovation-and-regulation-dont-mix/ [https://perma.cc/336T-
TKX9] (describing the author’s bad experience using a taxi and explaining that, at the time, 
“Uber [could not] operate in Miami, for example, where existing laws were clearly drafted to 
protect taxicabs from competition even from other licensed services”). 
42
 See, e.g., Downes, supra note 41 (outlining lack of motivation for taxi drivers to adopt 
improvements to the service they offered). 
43
 Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the 
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1710 (2008) (“revision of existing rules 
may be even more likely to fall victim to the factors responsible for the ossification of initial 
rulemaking”); cf. Cal. St. Senate Republican Caucus, Briefing Report: The Riveting 
Regulatory Process: A Study in Bureaucracy, CSSRC.US (Mar. 13, 2013), 
http://cssrc.us/content/briefing-report-riveting-regulatory-process-study-bureaucracy 
[https://perma.cc/F35S-HKY9] (outlining the steps necessary to propose a new rule and 
describing a process that will take months or years to complete). 
44
 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 
61 (1995) (“[A]gencies rarely amend rules because the amendment process is as daunting as 
the process of promulgating a rule.”); cf. Ronald M. Levin, A Blackletter Statement of Federal 
Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 30–36 (2002) (outlining the federal rulemaking 
process). The California process is similarly cumbersome and reactive. See CAL. OFFICE 
ADMIN. LAW, The Rulemaking Process, http://www.cfb.ca.gov/laws_regs/flowchart.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RK3L-FVPL]. 
45
 For an example of one state’s rulemaking process, see Flowchart of Public Rulemaking 
Process in California, OFFICE ADMIN. L. https://www.oal.ca.gov/wp-
 




Francisco had a law on the books from the 1980s that banned all short-term 
rentals.
46
 Airbnb hosts provided short-term rentals in the city for six years 
before the city changed that law. One member of the Board of Supervisors 
said that he had been trying for two years to write new rules to govern these 
rentals before changes were finally made in 2014.
47
 Similarly, taxi companies 
are regulated across the country by the cities in which they operate.
48
 The 
result was an industry that had not kept up with consumer demand or 
technological change and thus was ripe for disruption.
49
 Additionally, the 
mechanisms available to regulators to enforce the rules were limited to 




Consequently, the industries that the platform-economy companies set 
out to disrupt in the first decade of the twentieth century were subject to a 
regulatory process that was slow, deliberative, and reactive. While existing 
regulations provided a way for the public to participate, these regulations were 
                                                                                                                               
content/uploads/sites/28/2017/05/Regular-Rulemaking-Flowchart_FINAL_June-2014-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E55R-CQBA] (describing at least 8 steps required to write and implement a 
California state regulation, including at least one and possibly two 45-day comment periods). 
46
 Bigad Shaban, Jeremy Carroll & Kevin Nious, Thousands Violate SF Housing Laws Using 




 See David Chiu, San Francisco’s Short-Term Rental Solution, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 1, 
2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/11/01/san-franciscos-short-term-rental-solution/ 
[https://perma.cc/XLF6-U8FP] (stating that after two-and-a-half years, the mayor of San 
Francisco signed a law the author wrote that will for the first time regulate short-term rentals 
in San Francisco). 
48
 See Bruce Schaller, Entry Controls in Taxi Regulation: Implications of US and Canadian 
Experience for Taxi Regulation and Deregulation, 14 TRANSPORT POL’Y 490, 490–506 
(2007) (analyzing taxi regulations in 43 North American cities, including 32 of the 50 largest 
taxi regulatory systems in North America as measured by the number of taxicabs). The taxi 
industry across the country is often cited as a prime example of regulatory capture in which 
the rules themselves act as a barrier to entry and so cushion incumbents from market forces. 
See MICHAEL FARREN, CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN, & MATTHEW MITCHELL, RETHINKING TAXI 




 See Downes, supra note 41. 
50
 Cf. Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 147, 184–94 (2016) (describing the limited mechanisms, mostly in the form of 
punitive tools, available to regulators). 




difficult to access or understand substantively and procedurally, and were 
focused on past ways of doing business.
51
 There was no incentive for 
regulators to stay on top of changes in the industry they regulated, nor to make 
amendments to existing rules. In this way, the regulators of the hotel and taxi 
industries operated in a bureaucratic culture in which change was not 
welcomed and happened slowly, if at all. 
 
B. The Culture of Platform Companies 
 
Silicon Valley culture, to which entrepreneurs all over the world pay 
attention, is based on a few long-standing principles. One is the belief that a 
successful startup should be built the “lean startup” way.
52
 Proponents of this 
method favor experimentation instead of elaborate planning, customer input 
over intuition, and designing in the open instead of in “stealth mode.”
53
 The 
second principle is building products or services using “agile development”: a 
model that incorporates feedback from users to quickly redesign and relaunch 
their innovation.
54
 As a result, entrepreneurs are used to being nimble, quickly 
                                                 
51
 Over-Regulated America: The Home of Laissez-Faire is Being Suffocated by Excessive and 
Badly Written Regulation, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/215
47789 [https://perma.cc/FE7S-ZBSX]. 
52
 Tim Raynor, Startups and the Hacker Way: The (Counter-) Cultural History of Lean 
Method, MEDIUM (Mar. 20, 2016), https://medium.com/@timrayner01/startups-and-the-
hacker-way-on-the-counter-cultural-history-of-lean-method-ce7e9b736ed1 
[https://perma.cc/WC3X-HUAL] (lean startup methods, along with design thinking and agile 
development, are the basis of hacker culture, which has been adopted by the Silicon Valley 
innovation culture); see Steve Blank, Why the Lean Startup Changes Everything, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (May 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/05/why-the-lean-start-up-changes-everything 
[https://perma.cc/Q72U-X3K6] (“On the basis of what I’ve seen at hundreds of start-ups, at 
programs that teach lean principles, and at established companies that practice them, I can 
make a more important claim: Using lean methods across a portfolio of start-ups will result in 
fewer failures than using traditional methods.”); see generally ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP: 
HOW TODAY’S ENTREPRENEURS USE CONTINUOUS INNOVATION TO CREATE RADICALLY 
SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES (2011) (describing the lean-startup method of growing a business).  
53
 Blank, supra note 52. 
54
 See Blank, supra note 52 (“[A]gile development eliminates wasted time and resources by 
developing the product iteratively and incrementally. It’s the process by which start-ups create 
the minimum viable products they test.”). The team then uses the consumers’ feedback on the 
Minimum Viable Product to create successive versions of the product or service. Id. In each 
cycle, user feedback is quickly adopted and a new version is released. Id. The agile method 
differs from the traditional waterfall model. See Jim Bowes, Agile vs. Waterfall: Comparing 
Project Management Methods, MANIFESTO (July 17, 2014), https://manifesto.co.uk/agile-vs-
 




addressing consumers’ issues that arise with a particular version of their 
product, or “pivoting” to a new product when feedback indicates that the 
appeal of their current minimum viable product is limited. 
Following the lean-startup method and the agile-development process, 
entrepreneurs have embraced a culture of disruption, often based on the 
philosophy of “ask forgiveness, not permission.”
55
 Although this principle 
was not designed to foster rule breaking, entrepreneurs have applied this 




C. The Clash of Two Very Different Cultures 
 
New technologies allow innovators to engage with prospective users 
early in the creative process to receive feedback while the product or service 
is still in development. Therefore, entrepreneurs are used to welcoming 
change; new feedback continually informs their understanding of user needs 
and preferences.
57
 State and federal regulatory processes, however, tend to be 
                                                                                                                               
waterfall-comparing-project-management-methodologies/ [https://perma.cc/XA97-YRMU]. 
The waterfall method is a process in which each a product moves linearly through each phase 
of its life cycle from design to implementation. See id. Then, the product is tested at the final 
stage of execution of the design. See id. Only after testing is complete is the product or service 
released to consumers. See id. 
55
 See Bill Murphy, Jr., Want to Succeed in Life? Ask for Forgiveness, Not Permission, INC 
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.inc.com/bill-murphy-jr/9-words-to-live-by-its-always-better-to-
beg-forgiveness-than-ask-permission.html [https://perma.cc/4BNH-ZH8S] (“[I]t’s a popular 
mantra  now,  among high-performing entrepreneurs.”); Neil Irwin, For Start-Ups Looking to 
Disrupt Regulated Industries, the New Strategy Is: Ask Forgiveness, Not Permission, N.Y. 




 See Mike Bishop, Breaking the Law—How Many Great Entrepreneurs Get Their Start, 
LINKEDIN (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/breaking-law-how-many-great-
entrepreneurs-get-start-mike-bishop-jd/ [https://perma.cc/5UMC-T4WH]; see also Aarti 




 See Ted Ladd, The Limits of the Lean Startup Method, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/03/the-limits-of-the-lean-startup-method [https://perma.cc/B39P-6EW6] 
(acknowledging the popularity of Eric Ries’ lean startup method); Steve Lohr, The Rise of the 
Fleet-Footed Startup, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/busi
ness/25unboxed.html?dbk [https://nyti.ms/2rNjH0a] (describing Eric Ries’ method: “the start-
 




slow and deliberative, involving years of preliminary fact finding activities, 
rulemaking notices, public hearings, proposed rules, and comment periods 
before new rules are able to be promulgated.
58
 
Conceptually, the ways in which platform companies' attitudes of 
disruption clash with traditional regulatory systems can be separated into three 
categories: (1) Nimble Methods versus Slow Deliberative Methods, (2) New 
Business Models versus Old Rules, and (3) Many Resources versus Few 
Resources. Following this roadmap, Part II of this article will demonstrate 
how the clash of culture played out in the regulatory battles of the two largest 
platform companies: Uber and Airbnb. 
 
1. Nimble Methods Versus Slow Deliberative Methods 
 
Entrepreneurs in the platform economy often base their businesses on 
the agile development process.
59
 Their reliance on nimble processes makes it 
difficult for innovators to understand and respect the drawn-out process of 
regulation.
60
 This lack of respect can make entrepreneurs disinclined to follow 
                                                                                                                               
up should continually experiment by tweaking its offering, seeing how the market responds 
and changing the product accordingly.”). 
58
 Cf. Flowchart of Public Rulemaking Process in California, supra note 45 (describing at 
least eight steps required to write and implement a California state regulation, including at 
least one and possibly two forty-five-day comment periods).  
59
 See, e.g., John Glover, Uber and Airbnb: The Importance of Agile Working in 2015, 
KAHOOTZ (June 3, 2015), http://cloud-collaboration.kahootz.com/uber-and-airbnb-the-
importance-of-agile-working-in-2015 [https://perma.cc/7L8Z-HS5U] (describing how Uber, 
Airbnb, Alibaba and Facebook all have broken away from traditional business models and 
used agile development methods to become successful). 
60
 Cf. Ingrid Lunden, Uber’s Travis Kalanick on Regulators: You Have to Grit Your Teeth, Be 
a Warrior, or Do Something Less Disruptive, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 12, 2012), 
https://techcrunch.com/2012/09/12/ubers-travis-kalanick-on-regulators-you-have-to-grit-your-
teeth-be-a-warrior-or-do-something-less-disruptive/ [https://perma.cc/ZK2W-CMS9] 
(mentioning the length of the decision-making process a one of three ways that regulators get 
things wrong when regulating innovative companies); Matt McFarland, America’s Clumsy 
Regulation of Drones Stirs Up Frustration, Confusion, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2010), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2014/12/09/americas-clumsy-
regulation-of-drones-stirs-up-frustration-confusion/ [https://perma.cc/X8TV-TCVH] 
(describing a drone operator as frustrated by regulators that don’t keep up with a rapidly 
developing field); Howard Beales, et al., Government Regulation: The Good, the Bad, & the 
Ugly, REG. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT FEDERALIST SOC. (June 12, 2017), 
https://regproject.org/paper/government-regulation-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly/ 
[https://perma.cc/38XE-BQF7] (“[U]nlike ecosystems and interactions in non-government 
 






 Ironically, however, it is specifically what entrepreneurs 
disrespect about regulation, the existence of regulatory capture and the slow 
deliberative methods of regulators, that fosters the consumer demand or “pain 






                                                                                                                               
spheres, where individuals and organizations are constantly learning from past experience and 
updating their behavior accordingly, the regulatory sphere has no feedback loop.”). 
61
 See Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-
authorities.html [https://nyti.ms/2lngDck] (noting that “Uber has long flouted laws and 
regulations to gain an edge”). Some academics have adopted the argument that regulations 
should not apply to startups. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, E-Commerce, Entrepreneurship 
and the Law: Reassessing a Relationship, in THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
POLICY: GOVERNANCE, STARTUPS AND GROWTH 199 (David M. Hart, ed., 2003) (writing that 
for entrepreneurial companies, “no regulation seems the best of all options”); Arun 
Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy, WIRED 
(Oct. 22, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-
government-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/V249-ZVSQ] (arguing 
that rating systems on platforms replace the need for regulation).  
62
 Jeffrey Carter, What’s a Pain Point?, POINTS AND FIGURES (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://pointsandfigures.com/2012/04/27/whats-a-pain-point/ [https://perma.cc/7CBZ-HLR5] 
(stating that “a pain point is a problem, real or perceived. Entrepreneurs create opportunities 
for themselves by creating solutions to those pain points. Solutions create value for 
everyone.”). The larger the pain point, the more consumers will be benefited by the solution. 
For example, New York has long restricted the number of medallions for taxi drivers. See 
Lawrence Van Gelder, Medallion Limits Stem from the 30s, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/11/nyregion/medallion-limits-stem-from-the-30-s.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2jhBePl]. Even in 2016, there were only 13,347 medallions. See N.Y. CITY 
TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 2 http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downl
oads/pdf/annual_report_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS44-VGTW]. By early 2017, cars driven 
for Uber and Lyft exceeded the number of New York City yellow cabs by 4 to 1. Rachel 
Sugar, Uber and Lyft Cars Now Outnumber Yellow Cabs in NYC 4 to 1, CURBED (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://ny.curbed.com/2017/1/17/14296892/yellow-taxi-nyc-uber-lyft-via-numbers 
[https://perma.cc/MK3M-C243]. Cf. Jordan Chittley, Taxi Industry Losing War to Uber 




[https://perma.cc/BK4A-JKRK] (noting that Uber and other ridesharing companies took 
advantage of this situation by increasing the availability of rides as well as creating on-
demand access to their services).  




2. New Business Models versus Old Rules 
 
While previously it has been possible to find a shared ride or a 
vacation home to rent on community bulletin boards or local newsletters, 
platform companies have greatly expanded the number of these transactions 
and monetized them by taking a fee when a transaction results between users 
and providers on their platform.
63
 New technologies allow the founders of 
platform companies to directly connect the users of services to those who can 
provide them. As a result, platform companies do not own assets fundamental 
to the services they provide.
64
  
Existing regulations for taxi companies and hotels were written 
predominantly when taxi companies and hotels owned the cars and rooms, 
respectively, that they provided. The regulations therefore include rules about 
the condition, hygiene, and use of those assets.
65  
Because platform companies 
do not own these fundamental assets, founders of these companies argue that 
the regulations written for incumbent companies do not apply to them.
66
 This 
argument enables platform companies to continue to operate after regulators 
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 See Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES SCI. & 
TECH. 3 (2016) http://issues.org/32-3/the-rise-of-the-platform-economy/ 
[https://perma.cc/F6G9-26EZ] (noting that Uber, Airbnb, and Facebook are not based on 
“sharing”; rather, they monetize human effort and consumer assets). One characteristic of 
making these connections in the traditional way was that the user often knew the provider or 
they were members of the same community and were incentivized to treat each other fairly to 
preserve their reputations in the community. The platform companies and their supporters 
argue that they have replicated this trust through their ratings systems. See Arun 
Sundararajan, supra note 61 (“In the sharing economy, reputation serves as the digital 
institution that protects buyers and prevents the market failure that economists and policy 
makers worry about.”) (emphasis added); but see Armitage, supra note 30, at 29–31 (ratings 
systems do not function effectively to protect consumers). 
64
 Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ted Mann, Taxi Apps Face Bumpy Road, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 
2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204005004578082630070372690 
(“Uber CEO Travis Kalanick says regulators misunderstand his company because, unlike cab 
or limo companies, Uber doesn’t own cars or employ drivers.”). 
65
 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 25, §§ 32–46 (2017) (hotel owners are legally required to 
maintain the safety and cleanliness of their properties at all times); New York, N.Y., Rules of 
New York City. ch 35. §§ 51–83 (legal requirements for taxicab and limousine safety in New 
York City).  
66
 See Lunden, supra note 60 (stating that regulators put the brakes on in cases where they 
haven’t actually established rules and quoting Travis Kalanick saying that “[a] regulator is 
supposed to create and enforce a standard. If they don’t have a standard, that doesn’t make it 
illegal.”).  




attempt to ban their operations. Being able to argue that regulations do not 
apply to them is critical to the survival of these innovative companies.
67
   
Platform companies grow quickly in part because, if they have 
successfully solved a major “pain point” for consumers, many people want to 
use their services. The large user base that results from this demand provides 
these companies with leverage over regulators in three powerful ways. First, 
users can be easily mobilized to create a groundswell of public opposition if 
regulators threaten to restrict the availability of their services.
68
 Second, 
millions of users indicate that the business has traction, which attracts 
additional investments from venture capitalists. With these additional funds, 
platform companies can lobby the government, afford expensive litigation, 
and finance campaigns to influence public opinion.
69
 Third, platform 
technology enables companies to amass large amounts of data. This data could 
be extremely useful to city and state officials as they plan for the future and 
                                                 
67
 Platform companies that have attempted to comply with regulators from the time they 
launch claim they have been put out of business by the process. See Susie Cagle, How a 




 See Derek Thompson, How Uber’s Taxi App is Changing Cities, ATLANTIC (Nov. 23, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/how-ubers-taxi-app-is-changing-
cities/281451/ [https://perma.cc/YDY9-73RU] (describing a late-night social media campaign 
by Uber to defeat a proposed Congressional amendment). Airbnb also employed this strategy 
to defeat Proposition F in San Francisco in 2015. See Carolyn Said, Prop. F: S.F. Voters 
Reject Measure to Restrict Airbnb Rentals, S.F. GATE (Nov. 4, 2015), 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Prop-F-Measure-to-restrict-Airbnb-rentals-
6609176.php [https://perma.cc/JRH6-BSVX].  
69
 In 2016, Airbnb’s revenue was estimated at nearly $1.7 billion and the company was valued 
at $30 billion. See Tessa Love, Airbnb’s Revenue Soars 89 Percent, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 1, 
2016), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2016/09/01/airbnbs-revenue-soars-
compared-to-hotels.html [https://perma.cc/U4WW-E3D9]. During the first half of 2015, 
Uber’s revenue exceeded $650 million. Brian Solomon, Leaked: Uber’s Financials Show 
Huge Growth, Even Bigger Losses, FORBES (Jan. 12, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/01/12/leaked-ubers-financials-show-huge-
growth-even-bigger-losses/#65257b3d5c99 [https://perma.cc/ST39-MJTR]. Because Uber’s 
revenue model suggested traction, even though the company had lost money in 2015, Uber 
was valued at $62.5 billion in a 2016 funding round. See Eric Newcomer & Glen Carey, Uber 
Receives $3.5 Billion Investment from Saudi Wealth Fund, BLOOMBERG (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-01/uber-receives-3-5-billion-investment-
from-saudi-wealth-fund [https://perma.cc/Q2JQ-9LQJ]. 




assess the impact of the platform companies on their jurisdictions.
70
  
Ownership of this data provides companies with a valuable bargaining chip 
when negotiating with local officials.  
Traditional regulations can be difficult to apply to the new business 
models of the platform economy companies for yet another reason. Most rules 
are written for commercial enterprises and are based on two assumptions 
about the targeted businesses: first, they will possess a certain level of 
knowledge and sophistication about regulations and the regulatory process; 
and second, they will have the resources necessary to comply with complex 
regulations. The business model of the platform companies, however, permits 
individuals to earn income from activities previously available only to 
employees.
71
 One of the founders of Airbnb, Brian Chesky, acknowledged 
this point: “There were laws created for businesses, and there were laws for 
people. What the sharing economy did was create a third category: people as 
businesses.”
72
 The sorts of rules that are appropriate for business entities may 
not be appropriate for people who are providing the service as individuals 
using their personally-owned assets. These individuals often don't have much 
knowledge of the rules that apply to them now that they are, according to 
regulators, a commercial operation.
73 
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 See STONE, supra note 3, at 121 (noting how Uber had more access to city-wide traffic and 
transit data than any other company). See also Carolyn Said, Airbnb, HomeAway Settle SF 
Suit, Agree to Register All Hosts, SFGATE (May 1, 2017, 7:17 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Airbnb-settles-SF-suit-agrees-to-register-all-
11112109.php (mentioning how vital data was to Airbnb’s cease-fire with San Francisco) 
[https://perma.cc/TB3M-RR27].  
71
 Platform companies do not follow the traditional relationship between employer and 
employee. Instead, those who provide services on behalf of the companies, e.g., Uber drivers 
and Airbnb renters, are classified as independent contractors. This very important discussion 
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Benjamin Means & Joseph Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1511 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663350 
[https://perma.cc/VE5H-SMQ3]; see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to 




 See Andy Kessler, Brian Chesky: The ‘Sharing Economy’ and Its Enemies, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 17, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304049704579321
001856708992. 
73
 There is evidence that some property owners are using Airbnb’s platform to rent out 
multiple units, thereby operating true commercial enterprises. See, e.g., Chabeli Herrera, 
 




In sum, the new business models of platform companies cause 
struggles with regulators in three ways: first, they are able to argue plausibly 
that traditional regulations do not apply and thus continue to operate in the 
face of bans and prohibitive fees; second, they are able to quickly amass large 
consumer bases that supply additional pressure on regulators; and third, the 
actual provider of the commercial service, the owner of the asset used to 
supply the service is often an unsophisticated micro-entrepreneur. Thus it is 
not a simple matter for regulators to know the best ways to write rules that 
govern these innovative companies. For all these reasons, in a traditional 









                                                                                                                               
Airbnb and Hoteliers Battle Over Role, Regulations for Home-Sharing in Miami, MIAMI 
HERALD (May 25, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-
cruises/article79673612.html [https://perma.cc/VMD9-8R32] (“Airbnb operators who offer 
multiple units on the online service drove 62 percent of Airbnb’s regional revenue—about 
$76 million.”). Any regulations formulated to apply to Airbnb hosts should attempt to 
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commercial enterprises. There have also been complaints that fleet operators are using Uber’s 
platform to run a commercial ride-sharing business. See Ashleigh Davis, How Your Young 
Uber Driver Affords Such a Nice Car: Meet the People Renting Out Fleets of Cars to Drivers 
on the Ride Sharing App, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3553498/Meet-people-renting-fleets-cars-Uber-
drivers-ride-sharing-app.html [https://perma.cc/Y5XD-3B78].   
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 This term was used in an op-ed in the New York Times in 2014 to complain that the banks, 
which were “too big to fail” in 2008 and hence bailed out by the government, were being 
treated as “too big to regulate” six years later by the Federal Reserve as it once again refused 
to apply the stricter capital and leverage requirements included in the Dodd-Frank financial 
reform bill passed by Congress as part of the bail-out agreement. The Editorial Board, Too 
Big to Regulate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/opinion/su
nday/too-big-to-regulate.html [https://nyti.ms/2jGyZQK]. It seems that Kalanick himself was 
aware of the concept of developing a product that has become too big to regulate. Cf. 
Christine Laogoria-Chafkin, Resistance is Futile, INC (July–Aug. 2013), 
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201307/christine-lagorio/uber-the-car-service-explosive-
growth.html [https://perma.cc/ZK5T-X55L] (quoting Travis Kalanick) (“Uber riders are the 
most affluent, influential people in their cities. When we get to a critical mass, it becomes 
impossible to shut us down.”). 




3. Access to Resources versus Limited Resources 
 
Some platform-economy companies have the benefit of receiving 
substantial funding from private investors.
75
 With this level of funding, 
platform companies can engage in costly battles with regulators by utilizing 
lobbyists to influence state and municipal officials, and by employing lawyers 
to defend against court actions.
76
 
The regulators who challenge these companies often have limited 
resources. In recent battles, most of these regulators have been state and 
municipal—rather than federal—authorities.
77
 As compared to federal 
regulators, these local officials do not have the staff or resources to create or 
oversee the extensive regulations that would be needed to effectively control 
the platform-economy companies.
78
 Moreover, sometimes the platform-
economy companies control the data needed to enforce regulations and 
decline to share this data with regulators.
79
  
                                                 
75
 See Chris Meyers, Decoding Uber’s Proposed $50B Valuation, FORBES (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrismyers/2015/05/13/decoding-ubers-50-billion-valuation-
and-what-it-means-for-you/#57a5f2ee785a [https://perma.cc/TM3B-8FL6] (noting that in 
May 2015, Uber was the “world’s most highly capitalized startup”). In October 2017, Uber 
was valued at $69 billion. See Alexei Oreskovic, Uber will IPO by 2019 and let Softbank Buy 
a Huge Stake, Following a Big Board Meeting, BUS. INSIDER, (Oct. 3, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-board-says-it-approved-equality-among-shareholders-
and-to-move-forward-with-softbank-deal-2017-10?r=UK&IR=T [https://perma.cc/8Q6N-
4DTG]. In addition, some of the founders had funds of their own from prior successful 
startups they had sold. See STONE, supra note 3, at 119 (discussing Travis Kalanick’s payout 
from selling a business he founded, Red Swoosh).  
76
 See, e.g., Rosalind Helderman, Uber Pressures Regulators by Mobilizing Riders and Hiring 
Vast Lobbying Network, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/uber-pressures-regulators-by-mobilizing-riders-
and-hiring-vast-lobbying-network/2014/12/13/3f4395c6-7f2a-11e4-9f38-
95a187e4c1f7_story.html [https://perma.cc/A4FW-DTMJ].  
77
 The industries in which most platform companies operate, such as the taxi and hotel 
industries, have traditionally been regulated by the jurisdiction in which they operate, and not 
by federal agencies. See Eric Posner, Why Uber Should—and Will—Be Regulated, SLATE 




 For a list of the changes that would be needed to make existing regulations work with 
platform companies’ business models, see Miller, supra note 50. 
79
 See Annie Karni, Uber Loses TLC Appeal to Turn Over Trip Data, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 
22, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/uber-loses-tlc-deal-turn-trip-data-
 






For all of the reasons discussed above, attempts to regulate platform 
companies have not gone smoothly. Much of the tension between the 
entrepreneurs and the regulators stems from the platform companies’ 
innovative business models that are not obviously within the scope of 
traditional regulations. Some of the tension also stems from a clash of 
cultures: the iterative, fast-paced world of disruption does not mesh easily 
with the deliberative, slow-moving process of traditional rulemaking. In Part 
II, we will describe real-life examples of this tension as we delve into the 
details of the struggles of California and New York authorities to regulate 
Uber and Airbnb. 
II. REACTIVE REGULATORS AND UNCOOPERATIVE COMPANIES 
 
In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, technological 
innovation has allowed many nascent companies to provide traditional 
services like transportation and lodging to customers in new ways.
80
 As 
                                                                                                                               
article-1.2087718 [https://perma.cc/J6BH-LDEV]; Murray Cox & Tom Slee, How Airbnb’s 
Data Hid the Facts in New York City, INSIDE AIRBNB (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://insideairbnb.com/how-airbnb-hid-the-facts-in-nyc/ (detailing how Airbnb removed 
hundreds of listings by hosts with multiple properties in New York before providing data to 
NY officials) [https://perma.cc/KJ2T-Q75L]. Even when complying with regulations, Uber 
and Airbnb do not provide fine-grained information to regulators with respect to tax collection 
and background checks. See Emily Badger, What Happens When Uber and Airbnb Become 
Their Own Regulators, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/04/what-happens-when-uber-and-
airbnb-become-their-own-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/R64Q-NG2Z]; see also Kia 
Kokalitcheva, Most San Francisco Airbnb Hosts Shirk Regulations, Report Finds, FORTUNE 
(Apr. 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/08/airbnb-hosts-not-compliant-san-francisco/ 
[https://perma.cc/6PHS-ULLP]; Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Fined $7.6 Million in California 




 The platform economy goes beyond Uber and Airbnb, with other companies providing 
services such as car sharing, valet parking, and food delivery. Founded in 2014, Getaround is 
a car-sharing service that aims to decrease car ownership in cities. See Carolyn Said, City 
CarShare Hands Over On-Demand Auto Rentals to Getaround, S.F. CHRONICLE (Nov. 10, 
2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/City-CarShare-hands-over-on-demand-
auto-rentals-10605179.php [https://perma.cc/79QY-PUSR] (quoting Sam Zaid, Getaround 
CEO: “We see a true long-term shift in how consumers will access transportation in the 
 




established in Part I, there are inherent cultural and contextual reasons for 
regulators and platform companies to clash.
81
 A command-type regulatory 
system has few, if any, mechanisms to resolve or ameliorate the tensions.
82
 A 
regulator’s toolkit primarily provides punitive options, such as fines and 
cease-and-desist orders, to enforce regulations.
83
  
The struggle between platform companies and regulators often begins 
with a standard reactive response from the regulators after the company has 
already begun operating in the city. This pattern is borne out in the Uber and 
the Airbnb sagas in both San Francisco and New York. In neither city did 
regulators reach out with an offer of collaboration or an attempt to call a 
company in for discussions. Instead regulators drew a line in the sand by 
                                                                                                                               
future, moving away from ownership toward access”). Luxe Valet takes those who are 
hesitant to drive in cities due to lack of parking, and connects them with on-demand valets. 
See Sarah Tilton, San Francisco Entrepreneur Aims to Make Parking ‘a Delight’ with On-
Demand Valet, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahtilton/2014/10/23/
san-francisco-entrepreneur-aims-to-make-parking-a-delight-with-on-demand-
valet/#62ae7ae04407 [https://perma.cc/BZB4-D7JX]. Postmates provides both take-out food 
and grocery-store delivery to busy city dwellers. See Ryan Lawler, On-Demand Delivery 




 Although beyond the scope of this article, these clashes are likely with any new company 
utilizing agile development models to produce products quickly and bring them to market 
with an unproven beta model. Pressure is already mounting on regulators to provide 
legislative guidelines and limits to autonomous car companies as the technology becomes 
more and more accessible for consumers. Mercedes Benz, for example, has pledged to have a 
fully autonomous car available for the market by 2021. See Nathan Bomey & Thomas 
Zambito, Regulators Scramble to Stay Ahead of Self-Driving Cars, USA TODAY (June 25, 
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/06/25/regulators-scramble-stay-
ahead-self-driving-cars/100963150/ [https://perma.cc/52EC-FRLM].  
82
 Samuel Stayley, Taxi Regulation and the Failures of Progressivism, FOUND. ECON. EDU. 
(Jan. 4, 2012), https://fee.org/articles/taxi-regulation-and-the-failures-of-progressivism/ 
[https://perma.cc/7R2H-EKYE] (detailing the specificity and commands of taxi regulation: 
“Taxi regulations and codes fix prices by law, mandate the way fares are collected (meters), 
dictate hours of operation (24-hour dispatch service), regulate financial operations (by 
requiring financial reporting), promote public safety (vehicle inspections), set standards for 
language fluency and driver competence (tests), and include dozens of other regulations.”). 
83
 CHRISTOPHER CARRINGAN & ELISE HARRINGTON, CHOICES IN REGULATORY PROGRAM 
DESIGN AND ENFORCEMENT 28–46 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4706-
carriganharrington-ppr-researchpaper062015pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2FZ-4WRT] (detailing 
different kinds of regulation and enforcement and describing two for command regulations: 
discretionary punishment and nondiscretionary punishment). 




issuing cease-and-desist letters or enacting restrictive laws.
84
 Uber and 





 As the following sections will demonstrate, the 
resulting disputes created escalating costs and negative publicity for both 
sides.
87
 The battle began, however, with harsh and punitive responses from 
regulators that forced the young companies to adopt equally combative 
measures to keep the regulators at bay. 
 
 
                                                 
84
 See Lora Kolodny, UberCab Ordered to Cease And Desist, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2010), 
https://techcrunch.com/2010/10/24/ubercab-ordered-to-cease-and-desist/ 
[https://perma.cc/8D7X-HZRD]; Jessica Dailey, An Introduction to New York’s Short Term 
Rental Laws, CURBED N.Y.C. (Mar. 25, 2013), https://ny.curbed.com/2013/3/25/10260752 
[perma.cc/AN2L-MTFN] (2011 New York state law prohibits rentals of less than 30 days 
unless family member present or unit zoned as hotel or hostel); see also Joshua D. Wright, 
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Clemson University: Regulation in High-Tech 
Markets: Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC (Apr. 2, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/634631/150402clemson.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VFU6-CD6G] (in the taxi industry, “regulators have responded by doubling 
down on competition-reducing regulations rather than by allowing new disruptive competition 
to flourish”). 
85
 See Alexis C. Madrigal, The Rise of the One-Room Hotel, ATLANTIC (Nov. 11, 2010), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/11/the-rise-of-the-one-room-
hotel/66439/ [https://perma.cc/NC3W-XAZD] (noting that Airbnb reported booking 560,000 
rooms in the six months prior to the article); see also Michael Arrington, Huge Vote of 
Confidence: Uber Raises $11 Million From Benchmark Capital, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14, 
2011), https://techcrunch.com/2011/02/14/huge-vote-of-confidence-uber-raises-11-million-
from-benchmark-capital/ [https://perma.cc/C9MK-8GV4] (noting that between summer 2010 
and February 2011 Uber had tens of thousands of paid rides in San Francisco alone). 
86
 Cf. Nolan Hicks & Ben Ware, Uber, Lyft Spending Now at $8.1 Million in Prop 1. Race, 
MYSTATESMAN (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/local-govt--
politics/uber-lyft-spending-now-million-prop-race/NJUedjBB9NJs4hficHDsxN/ 
[https://perma.cc/8M7X-VDUE] (demonstrating Uber’s effort to create favorable 
regulations); Ben Popper, Uber Can’t Be Stopped, So What Happens Next? VERGE (July 27, 
2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/7/27/9035731/future-of-uber-regulation-illegal-
violations [https://perma.cc/P448-TQHL] (“We should be wary of Uber, which has so far 
flouted almost all attempts at regulation.”); Tim Redmond, Why is SF Tolerating Airbnb’s 
Bad Behavior?, 48HILLS.ORG (Oct. 6, 2016), http://48hills.org/2016/10/06/sf-tolerating-
airbnbs-bad-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/A46W-PUX9] (claiming the city’s Airbnb regulations 
are a total sham and the city cannot or will not control illegal rentals). 
87
 See infra text accompanying notes 117–118. 




A. Uber  
 
Part I described causes of tensions between regulators and platform 
companies: nimble methods versus methodical methods; new business models 
versus old rules and tools; and many resources versus few resources. These 
three causes of tension are demonstrated in many of the interactions between 
Uber and regulators in various localities. Uber was at first conciliatory 
towards regulators, offering to educate regulators about why its business 
model fell outside the categories of existing rules. As regulators continued to 
issue punitive rules and penalties, however, Uber became more 
confrontational and the fight escalated. While Uber eventually prevailed 
against regulators in most cities around the world, the position it ultimately 
embraced as a result—that it is not bound by existing rules— became, to the 





1. Early Interactions with Regulators 
 
Uber was first available to the public to book rides in San Francisco in 
July 2010 as UberCab.
89
 Despite its name, the company only provided a way 
to book an on-demand ride in a luxury vehicle with a licensed driver, thereby 
taking much of the hassle out of having to book and pay for a private ride.
90
 
Within three months, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and 
the San Francisco Metropolitan Transit Authority (SFMTA) issued Uber a 
cease-and-desist order for operating a taxi company without a license.
91
 In 
response, Uber promptly dropped “Cab” from its name and continued to 
                                                 
88
 See Dan Hill, Uber Doesn’t Have a PR Problem, It Has a Culture Problem, NEWSWEEK, 
(Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/uber-culture-problem-pr-585511 
[https://perma.cc/DLR8-C4U3] (“[t]hose kinds of ongoing and protracted legal and regulatory 
battles undoubtedly contribute to why the company’s posture continues to be hyper-
aggressive”). 
89
 See Leena Rao, UberCab Takes the Hassle Out of Booking a Car Service, TECHCRUNCH 
(July 5, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/07/05/ubercab-takes-the-hassle-out-of-booking-a-
car-service/ [https://perma.cc/BEA2-NQZ3] (describing UberCab as a new service when the 
article was written in 2010). 
90
 Id. (describing the service as convenient and asserting that passengers “receiv[e] better 
service, a nice black limo and an on-demand solution”). 
91
 See Kolodny, supra note 84. 




operate its black car service.
92
 The regulators meanwhile continued to insist 
that Uber needed to register with the state, but Uber, which had just raised a 
round of funding for $1.25 million,
93
 had the resources to hire lawyers. These 
lawyers ultimately convinced the CPUC that Uber was not a taxi or limousine 
service, but rather a referral service connecting those who wanted a ride to 
those who could provide that ride—just as Expedia or Orbitz were referral 
services that connected travelers to airlines.
94
 Uber also posted a conciliatory 
statement on its website from then-CEO Ryan Graves.
95
 By late 2010, the 
regulators agreed and issued a ruling allowing Uber to operate without 
registering with the state.
96
 
Uber, for the moment at peace with California regulators, took its 
black car service to New York in May of 2011.
97
 Because that business model 
(a limousine company using already licensed drivers) fit neatly within its 
existing rules, the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) initially gave Uber 
permission to operate.
98
 When Uber pivoted and began competing with the 
city’s taxi space in 2012, however, interactions with regulators became more 
heated. Even though UberTaxi was designed to use already licensed taxi 
drivers, Uber itself did not own medallions and wasn’t a licensed taxi 
company.  The TLC, using the tools available to it,
99
 issued rules that created 
heavy fines and a possible loss of commercial licenses for drivers that 
                                                 
92
 Laura Kolodny, Ubercab, Now Just Uber, Shares Cease and Desist Orders, TECHCRUNCH 
(Oct. 25, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/10/25/ubercab-now-just-uber-shares-cease-and-
desist-orders/ [https://perma.cc/9B7C-63W6]. 
93
 See Uber Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber/f
unding_rounds/funding_rounds_list [https://perma.cc/XBD5-BPNZ] (indicating $1.25 million 
was raised on October 10, 2010).  
94
 See STONE, supra note 3, at 122. 
95
 See Kolodny, supra note 84 (explaining that Graves indicated that Uber was “happy to help 
educate the regulatory bodies on this new generation of technology and work closely with 
both agencies to ensure compliance.”). 
96
 See STONE, supra note 3, at 122.  
97
 Uber NYC Has Launched, UBER (May 4, 2011), https://www.uber.com/blog/new-york-
city/uber-nyc-launches-service/ [https://perma.cc/ZW4F-JE9M].  
98
 Wortham, supra note 5. 
99
 The Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) of New York City has the authority to regulate 
and license all for-hire vehicles in New York City. See N.Y.C. Taxi and Limo Comm’n, supra 
note 10. Each of its rules contains specific designations of the penalty for non-compliance 
(most often a fine for operating without meeting the required licensing criteria). See, e.g., 35 
R.C.N.Y. § 78-02, (2017), http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/rule_book_current_ch
apter_78.pdf [https://perma.cc/D259-V5BM]. 




accepted rides through the Uber app.
100
 Uber quietly withdrew its taxi service, 
but within a few months the TLC decided to allow a pilot program in 
Manhattan. Around this time, Uber closed a Series B round for $37 million.
101  
 
Although there are no public records available to indicate exactly how Uber 
used its financial resources,
102
 it is quite possible that Uber utilized lobbyists 
to try to convince TLC commissioners to change their minds.
103
 In any event, 
TLC commissioners were soon stating publicly that e-hailing apps were 
inevitable.
104
 In late April 2013, UberTaxi was granted permission to operate 
in New York City.
105
 By early 2017, Uber had become a major player in the 
city.
106
 However, until quite recently, Uber was banned in all other parts of 
New York state.
107
 Existing taxi companies lobbied their state legislators hard 
                                                 
100
 Adrianne Jeffries, Uber Quietly Shutting Down Taxis in New York After Fight with 




 See Uber Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber/
funding_rounds/funding_rounds_list [https://perma.cc/B6C7-G3DA] ($37,000,000 Series B 
round closed Dec 11, 2012).  
102
 By 2014, it became public knowledge that Uber had employed an army of lawyers and 
lobbyists in different cities throughout the country. See T.C. Sottek, Uber Has an Army of at 




 See Rosalind Helderman, supra note 76 (noting that since 2012, Uber has hired private 
lobbyists in at least fifty U.S. cities and states). 
104
 Adrianne Jeffries, NYC Regulators Approve Limited Pilot Program for Taxi Hailing Apps 
Like Uber, VERGE (Dec. 13, 2012) https://www.theverge.com/2012/12/13/3762504/taxi-e-
hail-tlc-nyc-vote-uber-hailo [https://perma.cc/7GXX-8BC5] (quoting TLC Chairman David 
Yasky).  
105
 Adrianne Jeffries, After Long Battle, Uber Becomes First Taxi App to Get Approved in 
New York City, VERGE (Apr. 26, 2013) https://www.theverge.com/2013/4/26/4271490/uber-
becomes-first-taxi-app-to-get-approved-in-new-york-city [https://perma.cc/E87W-HB4L]. 
Skirmishes continue between the ride-sharing companies and the TLC. See, e.g., Dan Ravoli, 
Uber and For-Hire Car Companies Unite to Fight TLC Wheelchair Plan, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/uber-for-hire-car-companies-unite-
fight-tlc-wheelchair-plan-article-1.3529233 [https://perma.cc/D34Y-S4K6]. 
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 See Hu, supra note 9 (noting that Uber, “the deep-pocketed newcomer[,] has become the 
behemoth” in the ride-hailing market in NYC). 
107
 See Patrick Lohmann, Upstate NY’s Long Wait for Uber and Lyft Ending, What You Need 
to Know, NYUPSTATE (June 26, 2017, 12:15 PM), http://www.newyorkupstate.com/news/201
7/06/upstate_nys_long_wait_for_uber_and_lyft_ending_what_you_need_to_know.html 
 




to keep Uber out of their markets.
108
 Demonstrating the impact of regulatory 
capture, those regulators refused to change existing rules despite growing 




2. Uber Hardens its Positions as Regulatory Battles Continue 
 
By mid-2013, Uber was operating in San Francisco, Seattle, Los 
Angeles, Boston, Chicago, Washington, DC, New York City, and expanding 
internationally.
110
 In each locale, Uber confronted regulatory challenges, 
including large fines and outright bans.
111
 Perhaps as a result of all these 
challenges, Uber’s public stance changed from the conciliatory language of 
Ryan Graves’ blog post
112
 to the position that successful, innovative 
                                                                                                                               
[https://perma.cc/EB23-K42K] (Uber became “a political football in budget negotiations in 
recent years” in the State Assembly). 
108
 See Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite Against Uber and Other Ride-Share Services, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/cab-
companies-unite-against-uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f-11e4-
82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html?utm_term=.0cb6b7622211 [https://perma.cc/JXT6-6WAZ]; 
cf. Ben Carnes, New York Is Rightly Moving to Reduce Barriers for Companies such as Uber 
and Lyft, HILL (Feb. 9, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/318635-new-
york-is-rightly-moving-to-reduce-barriers-for-companies [https://perma.cc/HV4N-PBCL] 
(explaining that in New York state, “the cab industry has doubled down, using local insurance 
requirements and other regulatory clubs to continue to bludgeon Uber and Lyft”). 
109
 Cf. Carnes, supra note 108 (“These regulatory battles are a product of an entrenched 
monopoly’s taking for granted that a more efficient, more responsive service might emerge.”). 
110




 See Downes, supra note 41 (“Indeed, according to Kalanick, the company has spent much 
of its young life fighting in courts, public utility commissions, and city councils for the ability 
to offer any service at all. Uber has already fought charges, fines, and bans in San Francisco, 
Chicago, Massachusetts, New York, Washington D.C, and recently in Toronto, where city 
officials have charged the company with dispatching rides without a license.”). These 
responsive reactions by regulators are typical of what is happening throughout the country. 
See, e.g., Tim Elfrink, UberX will Launch in Miami Today, Defying Miami-Dade’s Taxi Laws, 
MIAMI NEW TIMES (June 4, 2014), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/uberx-will-launch-
in-miami-today-defying-miami-dades-taxi-laws-6533024 [https://perma.cc/LGK7-RC7Z]. 
New Orleans regulators even sent Uber a cease-and-desist before it began operating in the 
city. See Jeanie Riess, Why New Orleans Doesn’t Have Uber, GAMBIT (Feb. 4, 2014), 
https://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/why-new-orleans-doesnt-have-
uber/Content?oid=2307943 [https://perma.cc/FM4W-6ZRP].  
112
 See note 97. 




companies had to be “warriors” and keep on fighting.
113
 Uber was also quite 
willing to state its disrespect for government officials in public.
114
 In 2012, at 
TechCrunch Disrupt, Travis Kalanick criticized lawmakers, alleging that they 
used three dubious strategies to challenge Uber: (1) they took steps to protect 
the industry they regulated; (2) they labelled something illegal if it didn’t fit 
neatly within their pre-existing categories; and (3) they didn’t do anything 
until they had the chance to assess the “optics” of the situation.
115
 In 2013, 
Kalanick said to a luncheon for Members of Congress that the anti-
competitive measures aimed at Uber by local regulators were the result of 
regulatory capture by the taxi industry.
116
 By 2014, Kalanick was blunt about 
the way he viewed regulators: “We’re in a political campaign, and the 
candidate is Uber and the opponent is [] named Taxi. . . . Nobody likes him, 
he’s not a nice character, but he’s so woven into the political machinery and 
fabric that a lot of people owe him favors.”
117
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114
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Julian Chokkattu & Jordan Crook, A Brief History of Uber, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://techcrunch.com/gallery/a-brief-history-of-uber/slide/14/ [https://perma.cc/BC8Q-
FK2N]. Whether coincidental or not with that change in management and/or the fights with 
regulators in New York, by 2011, Uber had become publicly more hostile towards regulations 
and regulators than it was in 2010.  
115
 See Lunden, supra note 60. 
116
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54/travis-kalanick-uber-is-raising-more-money-to-fight-lyft-and-the [https://perma.cc/RUV4-
RX4W]. 




Despite the public criticisms described above, Uber was quite willing 
to work behind the scenes to influence regulators.
118
 In addition, Uber learned 
the power of its large user base.
119
 Uber demonstrated in Washington, D.C. 
how easily it could mobilize the many consumers of its services to provide 
direct pressure on their representatives in state and local government.
120
 As a 
result of the many resources available to it,
121
 Uber has been able to adopt a 
strategy of being one thing for one audience (highly-paid lobbyists for 
politicians) and a different entity altogether for a second audience (a social 
movement against backward-thinking regulators for its users). 
This willingness to fight would continue even when conditions 
changed. While Uber had been fighting to launch its black-car service in cities 
around the world, three companies in San Francisco had begun offering peer-
to-peer ridesharing in which noncommercial drivers use their privately-owned 
cars to offer rides on-demand.
122
 Despite its previous interactions with Uber 
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and its eventual accommodation of the black car service, the CPUC returned 
to the same punitive enforcement mechanism it always used: it issued cease-
and-desist letters to Lyft, Sideshow, and Tickengo.
123
 The companies, 
however, continued to operate.
124
 The CPUC responded by issuing citations 
for $20,000 fees to Lyft and Sidecar.
125
 The companies protested publicly, 
arguing that the charter-carrier regulations that the CPUC cited were 
inapplicable to their business models.
126
 In this now-familiar refrain of (1) 
launch of innovative service; (2) cease-and-desist letters issued by regulators; 
(3) continued operation by innovators; (4) imposition of fees by regulators; 
and (5) public protest, there was one indication that something had changed: 
the CPUC indicated that it would work with the companies to determine rules 
to regulate their services.
127
  
Uber’s initial response to these developments in its hometown was to 
try to get the ridesharing companies shut down.
128
 Even though the CPUC 
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indicated that it was interested in speaking with the ridesharing companies to 
receive their help to write new rules,
129
 Uber ignored the opportunity to 
collaborate and launched a lobbying campaign with the CPUC against Lyft 
and SideCar.
130
  Meanwhile, it was likely working on a competitive product in 
case regulators allowed ridesharing companies to operate in California.
131
 
In January 2013, the CPUC issued a consent decree with temporary 
rules that protected consumers until a more complete analysis of the industry 
could be undertaken.
132
 Uber signed the decree as well and began offering 
ridesharing services.
133
 California eventually became the first state to write 
permanent regulations aimed specifically at ridesharing companies.
134
 These 
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regulations became a template used by many other jurisdictions to craft their 




3. Uber Broadens its Defiance 
  
Shortly after announcing its own ridesharing services, Uber publicly 
released its principled approach to the conflicts between ride sharing and 
regulation in the form of a white paper: Principled Innovation: Addressing the 
Regulatory Ambiguity Around Ridesharing Apps.
136
 Despite its claim in the 
White Paper to only operate where it has at least tacit regulatory approval,
137
 
Uber used its resources—financial and technological—to work around 
regulatory restrictions.  
In some cities—like Austin, Texas—Uber used a different strategy to 
defy regulators: it had sufficient resources to ignore the potential revenues 
from the city and so opted to leave when the city continued to require 
background checks for all drivers.
138
 In Portland, Oregon, Uber adopted yet 
another strategy, demonstrating not only its ongoing disrespect for regulation, 
but also the resources—this time not financial, but technical—it had at its 
disposal. The company’s engineers developed a new technology named 
Greyball that recognized when an enforcement officer used Uber’s app to hail 
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 When residents of Austin, Texas did not approve favorable rules for the regulation of 
ridesharing companies, Uber pulled out of Austin completely. See Eliana Dockterman, Uber 
and Lyft Are Leaving Austin after Losing Background Check Vote, FORTUNE (May 8, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/08/uber-lyft-leaving-austin/ [https://perma.cc/88ZX-78KU]. 






 Once such an officer is identified as requesting a ride, the Greyball 
software immediately cancels the ride. The result was that agents had a 
difficult time collecting evidence that the company was operating illegally. 
Allegedly, Uber used Greyball around the world to defy regulatory bans.
140
 
The U.S. Department of Justice has launched an investigation into the 




There are other instances of Uber leveraging its technological acumen 
to skirt what is legally acceptable. For instance, in another program 
(codenamed Hell) the company developed software that could track its drivers 
to identify those Uber drivers who also drove for other ride-sharing 
competitors, specifically Lyft.
142
 The software then targeted those drivers and 
prioritized placing customers in their cars to keep them from switching to a 
different app.
143
 Once Uber’s Hell program was revealed, drivers filed a class 
action lawsuit against the company for violating driver privacy and sought 
damages for anti-competitive behavior.
144
 
Additional deceptive practices have also been alleged. A lawsuit has 
been filed against the company alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 
fraud, and unfair competition on the grounds that Uber uses software that 
shows riders fares based on one route but directs drivers to take a shorter, 
more efficient route.
145
 Riders are charged for the longer route while drivers 
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are paid for the shorter route, with Uber pocketing the difference.
146
 More 




Despite all the regulatory disputes and lawsuits, Uber continued to act 
as if regulations did not apply to them. In late 2016, Uber, still headquartered 
in San Francisco, announced that, although its initial testing of its driverless 
cars had taken place in Pittsburgh, where it will continue to run, it was now 
bringing them to San Francisco, and they would be publicly available.
148
 The 
California Department of Motor Vehicles issued rules for testing autonomous 
vehicles in May of 2014 and required all manufacturers of driverless cars to 
register them and receive a permit before testing them on California streets.
149
 
Twenty companies complied with these regulations, including Waymo, Tesla, 
and General Motor’s Cruise subsidiary.
150
 Uber, however, adopted a familiar 
stance by beginning to test-drive its autonomous vehicles in San Francisco 
without first registering with the DMV.
151
 The DMV immediately stated that 
Uber was operating illegally for failure to register the cars on its site and 
issued a cease-and-desist order.
152
 The DMV subsequently pulled the 
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registration on all of Uber’s self-driving cars (which were registered as 
traditional vehicles) and demanded that the company go through the necessary 
steps to receive a permit.
153
 Rather than comply, Uber echoed its reaction in 
Austin and moved its autonomous vehicle operations to Phoenix.
154
 Within 
three months, however, Uber returned to San Francisco.
155
 With very little 
fanfare, it complied with the DMV’s licensing regime and began once again to 
test its vehicles on the city’s streets.
156
 
The attitude of disruption of anything and everything in its path began 
to catch up to Uber and Travis Kalanick in 2017. In the first three-quarters of 
the year, Uber has dealt with six major lawsuits involving sexual harassment, 
privacy violations, driver classification, intellectual property, deceptive 
practices and fights between Board members.
157
 Travis Kalanick resigned as 
CEO
158
 and the Board voted to remove his super-voting rights, although he 
will retain a seat on the Board.
159
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Over the course of its short life, Uber became the poster child of 
disruption. The company is known for not only disrupting the taxi industry, 
but also for disrupting regulatory systems.
160
 The conciliatory language of the 
2010 blog post, describing a desire to work with regulators, was lost in the 
need to fight outright bans, punitive fees, and expensive lawsuits. As Uber 
pushed into new cities and continued its regulatory battles, investors and the 
public initially responded with support and encouragement.
161
 Unfortunately, 
Uber applied that same aggressive defiance to every aspect of its business, and 
negative consequences continue to arise.
162
 It is unlikely that one single factor 
caused Uber’s corrosive culture. Nevertheless, it is interesting to ponder 
whether Uber might have adopted a company mantra other than defiance, if 
regulators had reached out with more collaborative tools at the time the 






Like Uber, Airbnb helped shape the platform economy in San 
Francisco. Unlike Uber, it had no immediate confrontations with California 
regulators. In fact, Airbnb operated for six years,
164
 simply ignoring 
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California’s 1981 law that banned all short-term rentals.
165
 When the Board of 
Supervisors, San Francisco’s legislative body, finally addressed the need to 
regulate home-sharing platforms like Airbnb, the Board had already 
recognized Airbnb’s benefit.
166
 The new law limited the number of days a 
property could be “shared,” and it required all hosts to register with the city, 
but the city had a hard time enforcing these requirements.
167
 
Although the General Counsel of Airbnb has asserted that the 
company had a desire to be authentic and transparent with customers and 
government officials,
168
 a series of harsh actions from state legislators 
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 New York state regulators did not see Airbnb in the 
same light in which it saw itself.
170
 In part, this unfriendly response was due to 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s long-time plan to go after avaricious landlords, 
but complaints about one of Airbnb’s New York hosts helped to produce the 
2010 law that contained a statewide prohibition of short-term rentals.
171
 The 
law made it illegal to rent out a residence for less than 30 days unless the 
permanent resident was also present.
172
   
At this time, Airbnb was still attempting to cooperate with government 
officials and offered to work with New York to pass a law that would impose 
an occupancy tax on its New York hosts.
173
 Nevertheless, the state’s harsh 
punitive reactions continued when the New York Attorney General issued a 




In response, Airbnb dropped its cooperative attitude.
175
 About to close 
a Series C funding round for $200 million,
176
 Airbnb used its resources to take 
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 Brian Chesky, Who We Are, What We Stand for, AIRBNB: BLOG (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://blog.atairbnb.com/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/9QDZ-76GH] (“On behalf of our New 
York City community, we want to work for sensible laws that allow New Yorkers to share 
their space, earn extra income, and pursue their American Dream.”). Airbnb also offered to 
set up a 24/7 hotline for complaints by New York residents about Airbnb rentals. STONE, 
supra note 3, at 228. New York policymakers were not impressed. See id. at 228–29. 
174
 Matt Chaban, Attorney General Eric Schneiderman Hits Airbnb with Subpoena for User 
Data, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/state-
airbnb-article-1.1477934 [https://perma.cc/3RQ3-HPYY]. According to Brad Stone, the 
Attorney General’s office believed that, despite its public announcements to the contrary, 
Airbnb was not attempting to take illegal hoteliers off its site or actually working on a way to 
collect occupancy taxes. STONE, supra note 3, at 228. 
175
 Cf. Gerry Shih, Accommodation Renter Airbnb Fights NY State Subpoena on Sublets, 
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2013, 6:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbnb-
subpoena/accommodation-renter-airbnb-fights-ny-state-subpoena-on-sublets-
 




New York to court.
177
 Airbnb’s lawyers argued that the subpoena was too 
broad and violated its user’s privacy.
178
 The judge in the case ruled in 
Airbnb’s favor.
179
 The New York Attorney General issued a new subpoena 
that met the judge’s concerns and eventually, with no other choice, Airbnb 
agreed to turn over anonymized data.
180
 Despite receiving the data it 
requested, the state of New York continued to refuse to come to an agreement 
with the company to legitimize short-term rentals.
181
 As a result of these 
prohibitions and demands in New York and other jurisdictions,
182
 Airbnb 
                                                                                                                               
idUSBRE9981AR20131009 [https://perma.cc/X73J-26KY] (noting that David Hantman, 
Airbnb’s Head of Global Policy, criticized a subpoena for the records of all Airbnb hosts in 
New York State as “unreasonably broad” and vowed to fight it with “everything we’ve got”). 
176
 See Airbnb Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/air
bnb/funding_rounds/funding_rounds_list [https://perma.cc/E6SA-76GW] (showing that on 
October 28, 2013, Airbnb closed a Series C round with Founders Fund). 
177
 Shih, supra note 175 (“Airbnb, the room-rental service, went to court Wednesday [October 
9, 2013] to block a subpoena from the New York Attorney General”). 
178
 Id. (“The subpoena would be difficult for the company to comply with because it covers 
data from hundreds of thousands of separate records, the company told the New York State 
Supreme Court in a filing.”); David Streitfeld, New York’s Case Against Airbnb is Argued in 
Albany, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/technology/alban
y-judge-hears-case-against-airbnb.html [https://nyti.ms/2jczZk8] (quoting Airbnb’s lawyer as 
criticizing the subpoena for its “extreme and incredible scope” and for asking for its user’s 
“confidential information”). 
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 STONE, supra note 3, at 235. In 2015, Airbnb released additional data in response to 
continued complaint over a lack of transparency. See Yoav Gonen & Amber Sutherland, Most 




 STONE, supra note 3, at 276–77 (hotels and hotel workers’ unions began to realize how 
much of a threat Airbnb was to their industry and lobbied politicians to not sign an agreement 
with the company). 
182
 Cf. Griswold, supra note 169 (noting that, at the time the article was written, “Airbnb’s 
peer-to-peer rentals [were] being scrutinized in Los Angeles; Miami Beach, Florida; Portland, 
Oregon; Toronto; Barcelona; and Berlin”); Niki Cervantes, Santa Monica Gets Even Tougher 
on Short-Term Vacation Rental ‘Hosts’, SANTA MONICA LOOKOUT (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.surfsantamonica.com/ssm_site/the_lookout/news/News-2017/January-
2017/01_12_2017_Santa_Monica_Gets_Even_Tougher_on_Short_Term_Vacation_Rental_H
osts.html [https://perma.cc/2JCJ-WRXB] (describing registration restrictions that were 
imposed on Airbnb in the city of Santa Monica). 




quickly learned how to go to war with regulators and other government 
officials hostile to its business model.
183
 
This new attitude towards outside threats to its business was also put to 
the test in Airbnb’s hometown. In San Francisco, a coalition of housing 
activists, landlords, neighborhood groups, and hotel workers’ unions were 
unhappy about the leniency and unenforceability of the 2014 short-term rental 
law in the city.
184
 They joined together to get sufficient signatures to place a 
proposition on the November 15, 2015 ballot.
185
 Proposition F, if approved by 
the city’s voters, would severely limit the number of days permitted for short-
term rentals, require hosts and platforms to supply data on usage every 




Having learned in New York and elsewhere that appeasement did not 
always work, Airbnb went to war. In June, Airbnb raised another round of 
funding, this time for $1.5 billion,
187
 and quickly invested $8 million to defeat 
                                                 
183
 Cf. Adrienne Jeffries, Airbnb Will Fight Regulators on Behalf of Host Who Was Fined 
$2400, VERGE (June 5, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/6/5/4398534/airbnb-new-
york-fine-nigel-warren-public-policy-fight [https://perma.cc/53JT-TB3V] (noting that Airbnb 
was starting to “clash with regulators in New York City” and, for the first time, “proactively 
got[] involved in an individual case”). Stone has compared Brian Chesky, the CEO and 
founder of Airbnb, to Kalanick, stating that, although Chesky’s reputation survived better in 
these early years than Kalanick’s, Chesky was every bit as disruptive, determined, and 
unethical as Uber’s CEO. See STONE, supra note 3, at 278. 
184
 Carolyn Said, Prop. F Splits Neighbors on Whether Airbnb Hurts or Helps Housing, S.F. 
CHRONICLE (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Prop-F-splits-
neighbors-on-whether-Airbnb-hurts-6575919.php [https://perma.cc/4HTL-2KS2] (“Prop. F 
unites unlikely bedfellows—housing activists and landlords; unions, especially hotel workers; 
and neighborhood groups—to oppose short-term rentals.”). 
185




 Tracey Lien, Everything You Need to Know About San Francisco’s Airbnb Ballot 
Measure, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-
airbnb-prop-f-san-francisco-20151029-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/KHR7-LLXL]; Said, 
supra note 68 (Prop. F supporters believed the city’s existing regulations for short-term 
rentals were “toothless”). 
187
 Airbnb Funding Rounds, supra note 176 (noting that on June 28, 2015, Airbnb raised a 
Series E round for $1.5 billion). 






 It also demonstrated the power of its user base, mobilizing 
those who used its platform, whether as host or guest, to go door-to-door to 
convince voters that Prop. F was not the right way forward. On November 3, 
2015, Prop. F was defeated.
189
  
The city of San Francisco, however, had realized from this battle that a 
significant number of constituents were not satisfied with its apparent leniency 
with Airbnb and other home-sharing platforms. And, despite its victory, 
Airbnb’s image in the Bay Area had been tarnished by some of its ads during 
the campaign.
190
 The Board of Supervisors soon began to debate how to pass 
and enforce a new, more restrictive regime for short-term rentals. In June of 
2016, the new bill was passed, continuing to require all hosts to register with 
the city, but switching the burden of enforcement to Airbnb.
191
 If hosts listing 
properties in San Francisco had not registered with the city, Airbnb was 
subject to large fines (up to $1,000 per day) and criminal penalties.
192
 
Just as in New York, the company did not want to turn over data about 
its hosts or assume corporate liabilities for their actions.
193
 Shortly after the 
                                                 
188
 Biz Carson, Airbnb Has Spent More Than $8 Million Fighting a Proposed Law in San 
Francisco, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-
spends-8-million-against-prop-f-2015-9 [https://perma.cc/9GF4-AJTJ]. 
189
 Kia Kokalitcheva, San Francisco Voters Reject ‘Anti-Airbnb’ Ballot Measure, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/04/san-francisco-votes-airbnb/ 
[https://perma.cc/46S2-R2XH] (quoting an Airbnb statement after the vote: “This victory was 
made possible by the 138,000 members of the Airbnb community who had conversations with 
over 105,000 voters and knocked on 285,000 doors. The effort showed that home sharing is 
both a community and a movement.”). In contrast to the almost $8.5 million Airbnb spent, 
supporters of Prop. F raised just $1,138,567. City of San Francisco Initiative to Restrict Short-
Term Rentals, Proposition F (November 2015), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/City_of_San_Francisco_Initiative_to_Restrict_Short-
Term_Rentals,_Proposition_F_(November_2015) [https://perma.cc/HV6S-DF87] (listing 
funds raised by both sides). 
190
 See STONE, supra note 3, at 286–87. After the San Francisco vote, residents in other 
localities began to fight for restrictions on short-term rentals in their cities. Id. at 291. 
191
 Cf. Joshua Sabatini, SF Legislators Approve Tougher Rules for Airbnb, S.F. EXAMINER 
(June 7, 2016, 3:25 PM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sf-legislators-approve-tougher-rules-
airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/UU8K-J9W7] (noting that the legislation imposed fines on the short-
term rental websites themselves for posting listings of unregistered residents). 
192
 Id. For the latest version of the code, see S.F. ADMIN. CODE ch. 41, § 41A.5(g) (2017).  
193
 Cf. Kia Kokalitcheva, Airbnb Sues Its Hometown over Latest Short-Term Rental 
Crackdown, FORTUNE (June 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/27/airbnb-san-francisco-
lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/38PS-68SG] (describing Airbnb’s law suit against San Francisco 
 




law’s passage, Airbnb filed a suit seeking an injunction to prevent the city 
from enforcing the law, arguing that the new ordinance violated the 
company’s rights under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and the 
First Amendment.
194
 In response to Airbnb’s complaint, the Board of 
Supervisors passed Ordinance 178-16 which amended the law to “abandon[] 
any requirements or restrictions on the publication of a rental listing” and 
“ma[de] it a misdemeanor to collect a fee for providing booking services for 
the rental of an unregistered unit.”
195
 Nevertheless, Airbnb maintained its 
argument that the regulations violated their rights and added the argument that 
the regulations unlawfully imposed criminal strict liability.
196
 Airbnb used 
provisions of the CDA to argue that the company was not responsible—and 




As Airbnb was waiting for the ruling in the San Francisco, Governor 
Cuomo of New York signed a new law imposing harsh fines on short-term 
rental hosts that violate its provisions.
198
 New York had already banned 
rentals of fewer than 30 days in a multi-unit building, but the new law made 
listing an advertisement for such a prohibited rental also illegal, perhaps 
                                                                                                                               
challenging the regulations that required it to share data on rentals and imposed stiff fines for 
every unlisted property that appeared on its website).  
194
 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Airbnb, Inc. v. City and Cty. of San 
Francisco, No. 3:16-cv-03615-JD (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2016), ECF 1. 
195
 Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 
2016). This action by the Board of Supervisors to impose liability based on an action by the 
platforms, i.e., the collection of a booking fee, was a clever way to circumvent the protections 
the CDA provides for content posted on the Internet. 
196
 Id. at 1071. The 20-year-old Communications Decency Act was written to protect Internet 
providers from being responsible for content posted by users. Id. at 1074 (“Congress enacted 
Section 230 primarily ‘to protect websites against the evil of liability for failure to remove 
offensive content.’”) (quoting Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 
(9th Cir. 2008)). 
197
 See id. at 1071–72. See also Jack Segal, Airbnb and the End of the Short-Term Rental 
War [BeaconExplains], BAY CITY BEACON (June 14, 2017), https://www.thebaycitybeacon.c
om/politics/airbnb-and-the-end-of-the-short-term-rental-war/article_623e8b6a-511b-11e7-
8ad3-e3ce6bea0cf8.html [https://perma.cc/Z4N4-PLFU] (describing the history of the 2016 
lawsuit).  
198
 See Nathan Ingraham, New York Passes Law Making it Illegal to List Short-Term Rentals 
on Airbnb, ENGADGET (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/10/21/new-york-
passes-law-making-it-illegal-to-list-short-term-rentals/ [https://perma.cc/AB7P-N5GG]. 




subjecting Airbnb itself to the fines of up to $7,500 per violation.
199
 Within 
hours, Airbnb filed a lawsuit alleging that the new law violated its 
constitutional rights on much the same grounds it used in its lawsuit against 
the city of San Francisco.
200
 
In November of 2016, the judge in the San Francisco case ruled that it 
was unlikely that Airbnb would prevail on the merits of its claims.
201
  
Carefully distinguishing prior cases under the Communications Decency Act, 
the court found that the San Francisco law was not imposing liability on 
Airbnb for its role as a content publisher, but for its conduct in taking a fee for 
the booking of an unregistered listing.
202
 The court also found that Airbnb had 
not met the standards for First Amendment scrutiny or those for contesting the 
imposition of criminal liability.
203
  
Airbnb quickly recognized that it had its back against a wall. In the 
week following the judge’s ruling, Chris Lehane, Airbnb’s Global Head of 
Policy, wrote an op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle stating that the 
company was ready to cooperate with city officials to create a simplified 
registration system that would share information about hosts’ listings and 
rentals with the city.
204
 By the beginning of December, the company had also 
settled with the state of New York.
205
 




 Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues Over New Law Regulating New York Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/technology/new-york-passes-law-
airbnb.html [https://nyti.ms/2kqvvlv] (“[T]he company contends that the law violates the 
company’s constitutional rights to free speech and due process, as well as the protection it is 
afforded under the Communications Decency Act.”).  
201




 See Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1073–76. 
203
 Id. at 1076–80. 
204
 Chris Lehane, How Airbnb, SF Can Help Hosts Meet City’s Rules, S.F. CHRONICLE (Nov. 
13, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/How-Airbnb-SF-can-help-
hosts-meet-city-s-rules-10611714.php [https://perma.cc/YR2J-9U3Q]. On May 1, 2017, 
Airbnb and the city of San Francisco announced they had reached a settlement. Herrera 
Repels Legal Challenge to Short-Term Rental Law, Secures Settlement with Airbnb and 
Homeaway, CITY ATT’Y S.F. (May 1, 2017), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2017/05/01/herre
ra-repels-legal-challenge-short-term-rental-law-secures-settlement-airbnb-homeaway/ 
[https://perma.cc/VAC9-M7XT]. Airbnb agreed to a process that would ensure its users are 
registered with the city before their listings can be booked on the platform and to share data 
 




Airbnb has spent money, time and effort battling regulators and their 
harsh penalties for six years. Nevertheless, the company recognized that an 
attitude of defiance was no longer serving its interests.
206
 The bad publicity 
and aura of regulatory uncertainty from its continued battles with lawmakers 
was affecting the company’s valuation at either future funding rounds or an 
IPO.
207
 Perhaps if the regulators in New York and San Francisco had a more 
collaborative process for working with Airbnb when it first began to operate, 
everyone would have been better off. 
In this section, we demonstrated that traditional regulatory processes 
cause escalating tension between innovative companies and rule makers. In 
pursuit of their goals of consumer safety and economic growth, regulators are 
most likely to use antiquated enforcement mechanisms as the basis for their 
initial interactions with new entrants to the industry.
208
 In response, companies 
like Uber and Airbnb use their financial resources, large customer base, and 
continually evolving technology to avoid complying with rules they did not 
                                                                                                                               
on its hosts with the city on a regular basis. Id. Airbnb remains criminally liable if it fails to 
do so. See S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(e) (2017). 
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 See As Airbnb De-Escalates Legal Fight with Regulators, What’s Next?, INVESTORS BUS. 
DAILY (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.investors.com/news/as-airbnb-de-escalates-legal-fight-
with-regulators-whats-next/ [https://perma.cc/3M7N-B3QQ] (describing Airbnb’s transition 
form a “bare-knuckles approach” to starting to get along with regulators); see also Mike Isaac, 
Airbnb Pledges to Work with Cities and Pay ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/airbnb-pledges-to-work-with-cities-
and-pay-fair-share-of-taxes.html [https://nyti.ms/2mVTpq1]. Airbnb’s company culture lends 
itself to cooperation more than that of Uber. Its motto, “Be a Host,” may have opened doors to 
cooperation. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
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 See Kia Kokalitcheva, Airbnb Changes Its Tune in New York, FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/12/06/airbnb-drops-ny-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/6ML4-SZCC]. 
208
 Innovation has occurred in many industries, and as a result, regulators have been hard-
pressed to apply old regulation to new business models. Just as with regulators like the CPUC 
and the TLC, other regulators have been given broad authority over the industries they 
administer but their mechanisms are less and less fit for the job. See Stephanie Forshee, CFTC 
Announces Innovation Lab for Fintechs, NAT’L L.J. (May 17, 2017), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202786468443/CFTC-Announces-Innovation-Lab-
for-Fintechs [https://perma.cc/GA3G-C8JJ] (quoting CFTC Acting Chairman J. Christopher 
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believe applied to them. Ultimately, both sides compromised to some extent, 
but there was a great deal of time, money, and effort expended by every 
participant to get to that result. In Part III, we suggest a change in regulatory 
procedures so that similar losses do not occur when the next innovative 
business appears. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD FOR ALTERNATIVE RULEMAKING  
 
In the spirit of innovation, this paper posits a different method for 
rulemaking that may yield more positive results for regulators as well as 
innovators. The process we suggest is adapted from research and design labs 
around the world, and is called design thinking. Design thinking offers a 
modern organization or bureaucracy a means to cultivate creativity and 
innovation.
209
 It has been said that the success rate for innovation dramatically 




A. What is Design Thinking? 
 
Design thinking is a solution-focused method that begins by 
identifying a goal instead of a problem. In this way, the process encourages an 
action-oriented approach and uses “logic, imagination, intuition and systemic 
reasoning . . . to create desired outcomes.”
211
 Design thinking is also user-
centric and thus requires an examination of the needs, experiences, and 
viewpoints of the user.  
                                                 
209
 What Is Design Thinking?, DESIGN MGMT INST., http://www.dmi.org/?WhatisDesignThink 
[https://perma.cc/KU76-NAUQ]; see also Michael T. McHugh, Driving Government 
Transformation Through Design Thinking, FED. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.federaltimes.com/opinions/2016/08/24/driving-government-transformation-
through-design-thinking/ [https://perma.cc/V4NQ-DXT3] (“federal agencies are beginning to 
use design thinking to creatively address mission objectives and improve processes”). 
210
 See Linda Naiman, Design Thinking as a Strategy for Innovation, CREATIVITY AT WORK, 
https://www.creativityatwork.com/design-thinking-strategy-for-innovation/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XCC-GT48] (citing a 2014 study by the Design Management Institute to 
state that “[d]esign-led companies such as Apple, Coca-Cola, IBM, Nike, Procter & Gamble 
and Whirlpool have outperformed the S&P 500 over the past 10 years by an extraordinary 
219%”). 
211
 This description is drawn from a more expansive discussion of the attributes of design 
thinking. See Armitage, supra note 30, at 34–41; see also Naiman, supra note 213.   




The design-thinking process involves successive steps, each of which 
utilizes input from all stakeholders to forge workable solutions. The best 
solutions are identified and then tested through experimentation with actual 
users in real-world situations. The feedback gained from those users is then 
utilized to redesign the possible solutions, with the resulting versions again 
sent out for testing. These successive feedback loops are reminiscent of the 
iterative cycles of agile product development, and help in the same way to 




The specific steps of design thinking are as follows:  
 
 Identify the problem to solve  








 Choose and implement best solutions  
 Solicit stakeholder feedback  
 Revise and retest solutions  
 Continue with feedback loops until the most appropriate solution has 
been reached  
 Release the most appropriate solution to a small segment of the public 
in a beta test  
 Iterate process again based on data from beta tests 
 Test again and collect feedback 
 Continue process when necessary to adapt to new innovations 
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 See Lohr, supra note 57.  
213
 Divergent thinking—the process by which each stakeholder individually determines its 
own goals for the project—is an important part of design thinking because it ensures the 
integrity of each stakeholder’s specific goal. Goal setting is an important part of the design 
thinking process because it allows stakeholders to envision their ideal situation prior to 
making any outside considerations. 
214
 Divergent thinking is a vital part of the beginning of the design thinking process. 
Convergent thinking, during which the group as a whole examines the individual goals of 
each stakeholder, is at the crux of this method’s efficacy. Stakeholders must come together to 
discuss all the viewpoints they each must take into account in creating a solution.  




While design thinking may not be a panacea for every issue that 
plagues regulatory agencies, its emphasis on innovation and collaboration 
helps to facilitate open communication with entrepreneurs and the companies 
they build.  
 
B. Design Thinking in the Private Sector  
 
It is tempting to dismiss this agile and flexible process as relevant only 
to the sorts of teams that meet in co-working spaces in Silicon Valley. This 
collaborative method, however, is already making an impact in reimagining 
systems in various corporate sectors. 
For example, Kaiser Permanente hired innovation lab IDEO to help 
them rethink the processes Kaiser uses to manage patient care. The goal was 
to diminish medical errors and oversights while improving overall efficiency 
and return on investment.
215
 IDEO convinced Kaiser to include all levels of 
management in the process because successful innovation cannot occur in a 
vacuum.
216
 Members of the Kaiser Permanente Innovation Team spent long 
periods of time observing nurses and going through the design thinking 
steps.
217
 Ultimately, IDEO and Kaiser designed a new program called the 
Nurse Knowledge Exchange.
218
 This program has lowered costs by 47% and 
is now operating in every Kaiser Permanente hospital.
219
 
We posit that the same stakeholder-focused, collaborative process that 
Kaiser Permanente used for this successful innovation could also be 
implemented by governmental agencies in the regulatory process.
220
 
Regulators currently rely on punitive measures to achieve their goals of 
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 See Lew McCreary, Kaiser Permanente’s Innovation on the Front Line, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Sept. 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/09/kaiser-permanentes-innovation-on-the-front-lines 
[https://perma.cc/6KVW-GXR4].  
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 Id.  
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 Id.  
220
 Collaborative rule making that follows many of the design thinking steps—including 
iterative development—has been successful in some government agencies already. See, e.g., 
Forshee, supra note 208 (“By engaging with FinTech, we will learn where the friction points 
are between innovation and our regulations,” [CFTC Acting Chairman] Giancarlo said. “As 
we meet with more and more innovators, we can expect to see patterns emerge—to see which 
rules come up time and time again as the most problematic, the least able to adapt to evolving 
technologies.”).  




consumer safety, environmental health, and positive economic expansion.
221
 
But, as we explained in Part II, technology is developing so rapidly that 
companies can have programs or business models up and running long before 
regulators learn of their existence. For example, Uber created and used 
Greyball—a program that allowed it to evade law enforcement in cities where 
the platform company was under review—for three years before regulators 
discovered its existence.
222
 By utilizing design-thinking principles in the 
regulatory process, as behemoth private companies like Kaiser have done, rule 




The application of the design-thinking framework to the regulatory 
process can manifest itself in a number of different ways, but the most 
important functions must remain consistent: 
 
 The problem the rule is intended to address is identified 




 The stakeholders then meet to brainstorm solutions for the identified 
problem 
 The best solutions are chosen, often by a smaller working group, and a 
regulation is designed that implements these solutions 
 The initial regulation is presented to stakeholders, and feedback is 
solicited 
 The stakeholders then revise their agreed-upon solutions and retest 
them to make sure they address the identified problem 
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 See examples of punitive measures that California regulators and New York City 
regulators use, see generally Part II. 
222
 Greyball allowed Uber drivers to evade regulators attempting to ticket them for using the 
service illegally in Portland, Oregon. The program was in use across the United States from 
2014 to 2017. It was only brought to the authorities’ attention in 2014. See Isaac, supra note 
139.  
223
 See generally Armitage, supra note 30. For a description of design thinking as used to 
rethink the regulation of transportation and accommodation in Toronto, see MARS SOLUTION 
LAB, SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES: REDESIGNING REGULATION FOR THE SHARING ECONOMY (Mar. 
2016), https://www.marsdd.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MSL-Sharing-Economy-
Public-Design-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3GE-K298] (“The Sharing Economy Public 
Design project, a partnership between MaRS Solutions Lab, the Province of Ontario and the 
City of Toronto, applies a design perspective to this complex problem”).  
224
 See infra text accompanying note 229 for an example of the identification of stakeholders. 




 These feedback loops continue until the most appropriate regulation is 
produced 
 The new regulation is then tested in a smaller segment of the relevant 
population in what is called a “beta test”  
 Feedback is solicited from the beta test users 
 This beta test will return new information to consider and the 
stakeholders will revise the regulation 
 This process continues until the regulation best addresses problems 
identified 
 Feedback loops remain open so that regulation can be easily amended 
to account for new problems and new stakeholders 
 
C. Applying Design Thinking to the Regulatory Process  
 
Design thinking involves a nonlinear way of thinking and requires 
real-world experimentation.
225
 The team chosen to undertake the process 
together should be interdisciplinary and all should have the capacity and 
disposition to think collaboratively.
226
 Unlike a multidisciplinary team in 
which each person advocates for his or her own position, an interdisciplinary 
team focuses on a collective ownership of ideas for which everyone takes 
responsibility.
227
 “In its simplest form, design thinking is a process—





1. Identify the Stakeholders 
  
The underlying tenet of design thinking is that everyone affected or 
involved in the use of that which is being designed should participate in the 
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 See, e.g., Naiman, supra note 213 (“Methods for thinking like a designer include 
observing, interviewing, creating personas, empathy mapping, storyboards, associational 
thinking, creating low-tech prototypes, and decision-making analysis.”). 
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 Kaan Turnali, What Is Design Thinking?, FORBES (May 10, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2015/05/10/what-is-design-thinking/#30147b7d3c18 
[https://perma.cc/MR8J-QTNL]; design thinking has also been used as the basis for making 
personal decisions. See generally BILL BARNETT & DALE EVANS, DESIGNING YOUR LIFE 
(2016). 




design process. For example, for the creation of regulations for the ride-
sharing industry, the following stakeholders could be identified as having an 




 Ride-sharing companies 
 Car-sharing companies 
 Rental-car companies 
 Taxi companies 
 Local regulators 
 Public-transit systems 
 Airport representatives 
 City planners 
 Environmental-impact experts 
 Consumers 
 
2. Stakeholders Convene and Decide the Goals and Public Value of Specific 
Regulation 
  
Public value includes not only consumer protection, fair competition, 
and accessibility for all potential consumers, but also the social good that 
comes from the availability of the innovative service or product the new 
entrants to the industry provide.
230
 With design thinking, all stakeholders work 
together to identify the public value of a specific area of regulation. For 
example, taxi companies might identify the public value of regulations in the 
pay-for-a-ride space as leveling the playing field for all participants in the 
market. City planners and environmental experts might see the value of the 
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 This list is based on the stakeholders identified in the MaRS Solution Lab report 
undertaken for the city of Toronto. See MARS, supra note 223. 
230
 In a design thinking process for regulation, all stakeholders would be asked to consider the 
public value of what they would want the regulation to achieve. See id. at 21 (“[d]esigning 
effective regulation involves solving a trilemma: public value, administration and 
innovation.”); Cf. Shayne Kavanagh, “Defining and Creating Public Value”, GOV. FINANCE 
REV., 57, 60 (2014), http://www.gfoa.org/sites/default/files/GFROct1457_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BG53-7ZSH] (explaining how Mark Moore developed the concept of public 
value to ask public officials to consider the benefits and costs of public services not only in 
terms of dollars and cents, but also in terms of how government actions affect important civic 
and democratic principles such as equity, liberty, responsiveness, transparency, participation, 
and citizenship). 




data the companies would be required to share on the number and locations of 
rides given, which would help them improve their estimates for future plans 
and impacts. A new entrant to the market might favor regulations because 
there would be a straightforward, user-friendly process of complying. 
Alternatively, an entrant might ask for modifications to fit its specific business 
model. Regulators might favor being an educated, engaged, and respected part 





3. Stakeholders Brainstorm Possible Solutions 
  
Stakeholders should first separately identify solutions and then bring them to a 
brainstorming session with everyone together.
232
 The first half of this, the 
independent brainstorming, utilizes divergent thinking, while the second half, 





4. Stakeholders Identify a Few Best Solutions and Implement Them 
  
This implementation process is essentially a short-term pilot or 
experiment in which the best regulations are put to use for a set period of 
time.
234
 This part of the process could be referred to as a “sandbox” in which 
ideas can be tried out and quickly eliminated or redesigned. At this point, a 
smaller working group may be identified if not all stakeholders can devote the 
time and energy this requires. 
  
5. Solicit Feedback from Users 
  
In the case of a pilot regulation, the regulation would not just be 
published as a proposed rule, but would be immediately implemented. 
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 For the words of a regulator instituting this sort of process, see Forshee, supra note 208.  
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 Id.  
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 An Introduction to Design Thinking: A Process Guide, HASSO PLATTNER INST. DESIGN AT 
STAN., https://dschool-old.stanford.edu/sandbox/groups/designresources/wiki/36873/attachme
nts/74b3d/ModeGuideBOOTCAMP2010L.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUC5-8U28].  




Feedback would be solicited within a month or two from the companies 
operating under the regulation, as well as from users and other stakeholders 
impacted by the experimental regulation. This process is shorter and more 
informal than the current extended comment period of proposed rules and 
feedback is based not just on theoretical objections, but on experiences 
operating under the rules. 
 
6. Stakeholders Revise Solutions and Test Again 
  
Based on user feedback and with input from all stakeholders, the pilot 
regulation is revised and implemented for another testing period. 
  
7. Solicit Feedback Again 
  
Once again feedback is based on how the rules are working in the real-
world. 
  
8. Feedback Loops Continue Until an MVP Is Agreed Upon 
  
The Minimum Viable Product (MVP) is still an early version that will 
have ongoing feedback loops, but has met the minimum standards of the 
stakeholders and so is released to the public to be more widely used and 
tested. 
  
9. New Process Allows Continuous Tweaking 
  
For a regulatory process to be truly nimble and flexible, there will 
have to be ways for users and stakeholders to engage with regulators on a 
regular basis and work together to modify rules so that they are in line with 
changes in technology and the marketplace. 
  
10. These Steps Must Be Repeated for Each Industry 
  
This is not a one-size-fits-all process. The stakeholders, the public 
value, and the users will vary from one industry to another as will the 
regulations. 
 What are the foreseeable problems in bringing design thinking to the 
regulatory process? Possible trouble areas include: 
  




 Getting startups to the table 
 Incentivizing regulators to participate 
 Identifying the correct stakeholders 
 Prototyping and effectively iterating regulations 
 Providing sufficient time for testing without making the process too 
slow 
 Designing metrics that adequately summarize the impact the tested 
regulations are having on various stakeholders like the companies 
using them, the regulators enforcing them, and the public using the 




Ideally, applying design thinking to the regulatory process will 
transform the regulatory system. Under this system, agencies may be less 
prone to regulatory capture
236
 because rather than enforcing stagnant rules 
available for manipulation, they create and adapt living documents, more 
easily amenable to change.   
 
D. How Implementation of Design Thinking Could Address Harms Caused by 
Culture Clash 
 
As described in Part II, regulators were often playing catch up to Uber 
and Airbnb as the innovative business models evolved and the companies’ use 
of technology pivoted. Regulator’s limited access to resources, along with the 
inherent nature of traditional bureaucratic processes, curbed their ability to 
address new challenges brought about by innovation. Yet, despite this, 
regulators and innovative companies share a common goal: expanding access 
through transportation and accommodation. Unfortunately, the initial negative 
interactions pitted the regulators against the platform companies, and muddled 
any opportunity to recognize these commonalities. Overall, each stakeholder 
impacted by the emergence of Uber and Airbnb incurred harms that arose 
during the regulatory battles.  
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 For some solutions to these possible issues, see generally Armitage, supra note 30, at 31–
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 See Stigler, supra note 37. The ongoing nature of the proposed feedback loops should help 
mitigate any threat of regulatory capture. A possibility of regulatory capture in the design-
thinking framework may remain, especially because regulators will spend more time 
interacting in preliminary phases with innovative new companies. 




Design thinking has the potential to alleviate these harms. Below, we 
posit how the design-thinking framework could alter outcomes for all 
stakeholders:  
 
1. To Citizens 
 
The present regulatory system harms the public by not providing a 
method by which citizens can be protected while innovative companies test 
their products with early adopters.
237
 The iterative steps in a design-thinking-
based regulatory process would allow regulators to issue temporary safety 
rules and assign liability while products and services are in the beta-testing 
stage. The beta test itself could be limited by restricting the number of users to 
reduce the extent of potential harms. In this new process, stakeholders would 
convene regularly throughout the technology’s life cycle to reevaluate it. In 
addition, regular communication and collaboration may allow regulators to 
anticipate harms before they arise, and platform companies to address larger 
crises before they occur.
238
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 Consumer harms caused by Uber’s entry into the market are well documented. See Rob 
Lieber, Airbnb Horror Story Points to Need for Precautions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/your-money/airbnb-horror-story-points-to-need-for-
precautions.html [https://perma.cc/F64N-GYJL] (discussing the sexual assault and attempted 
murder of an American student in an Airbnb in Madrid); see also Kale Williams & Curtis 
Alexander, Uber Sued Over Girl’s Death in S.F., S.F. Gᴀᴛᴇ (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Uber-sued-over-girl-s-death-in-S-F-5178921.php 
[https://perma.cc/EL4A-PFHE] (discussing how an Uber driver struck a young girl in a hit 
and run accident in a San Francisco neighborhood); Niamh McIntire, Uber London Ban: The 
Scandals That Brought Down the Ride Hailing App, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 2017), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uber-london-ban-latest-news-scandals-
rape-women-sexual-assault-ride-hailing-app-tfl-india-a7961236.html [https://perma.cc/GEQ5-
J9C4] (discussing Uber’s widely publicized rape case in Delhi, India—one of the issues that 
led to the Uber ban in London). The term “early adopter” is well-known in the technology 
community and refers to the first small group of users who are eager to try out new 
innovations being tested in the marketplace for proof of concept and viability. Brian Kennedy 
and Cary Funk, 28% of Americans are ‘Strong’ Early Adopters of Technology, PEW RES. CTR 
(July 12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/12/28-of-americans-are-
strong-early-adopters-of-technology/ [https://perma.cc/C3JN-MD4E].  
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 If company data—for example, indicating the most highly used drop-off locations for 
early-morning ridesharing—was shared with regulators, municipal officials might recognize 
that to ease traffic congestion, traffic light automation patterns needed to be altered. Or, if 
certain neighborhoods draw most home-sharing bookings, regulators might decide to limit the 
 




2. To Cities 
 
Both Airbnb and Uber have disrupted large incumbent industries and, 
in doing so, have fundamentally changed the way cities function. For 
example, public transit systems have been impacted by the significant portion 
of citizens who now rely on ride sharing companies as their primary method 
of transportation.
239
 Similarly, consumers rely on Airbnb as an affordable 
alternative to costly hotels. As a result, both platform companies have had 
unforeseen effects on the city’s economy, ecosystem, and environment, such 
as pressure on the real estate market, increased traffic, diminished air 
quality,
240
 and increased signs of wealth inequality.
241
  In a regulatory process 
that follows the design thinking method, the inclusion of all stakeholders 
increases the likelihood that these sorts of potential impacts will be identified 
early in the process. The collaborative aspects of design thinking methods 
could also facilitate data sharing between platform companies and regulators 
                                                                                                                               
number of listings available in that area to maintain the character of the neighborhood for its 
residents. 
239
 Mary Wisnewski, Ride-Sharing Services Like Uber Cutting Into Public Transit Use in 
Chicago, Elsewhere: Study, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
local/breaking/ct-met-ride-hailing-survey-20171016-story.html [https://perma.cc/4DAR-
H8LF]. In some locations, ridesharing has become a valuable option for the daily commute. 
For example, in the fall of 2017, in San Francisco, a Lyft line can sometimes cost only $1.25 
more than taking the bus (based on tests conducted by the authors). While this is more 
expensive, riders might consider it “worth it” for speed, comfort, and reliability. 
240
 See Kate Gilbraith, Are Uber and Lyft Helping or Hurting the Environment, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/21/uber-lyft-helping-
hurting-environment-climate-change [https://perma.cc/ZQM8-X8EK]; see also Doug Tribou, 
In the Age of Airbnb, Michigan Beach Towns Try to Balance Renters and Residents, MICH. 
RADIO (Apr. 28, 2017), http://michiganradio.org/post/age-airbnb-michigan-beach-towns-try-
balance-renters-and-residents [https://perma.cc/L5UN-FJTG]. For impacts to the economy, 
see Fawn Johnson, How Airbnb and Uber are Changing the Nature of Work, ATLANTIC (Nov. 
13, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/11/how-airbnb-and-uber-are-
changing-the-nature-of-work/425402/ [https://perma.cc/4RPA-RBCE]; see also Nathan 
Heller, Is the Gig-Economy Working? Many Liberals Have Embraced the Gig Economy. But 
Can They Survive It?, NEW YORKER (May 15, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2
017/05/15/is-the-gig-economy-working [https://perma.cc/DB8U-LJ8D].  
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 See Keith Parkins, The Secret to the Uber Economy Is Wealth Inequality, MEDIUM (Dec. 
15, 2014), https://medium.com/dark-mountain/the-secret-to-the-uber-economy-is-wealth-
inequality-800859791a91 [https://perma.cc/EBZ2-AQYM]. 




without resorting to the costly lawsuits described in Part II.
242
 In this way, a 
process that mandates collaboration early on could turn regulations into 
mechanisms that meet the diverse goals of urban planners, politicians, law 






In 2014, Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky aptly noted that the rise of 
platform companies created a third category of commercial activity—one that 
describes people in their individual capacity functioning like businesses.
244
 
Initially, drivers and hosts bore all the costs for the services they provided 
through Uber and Airbnb; the press is full of stories of guests trashing Airbnb 
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 Cf. Stephen Melendez, Sharing Economy Giants Are Using Data To Build “The Taking 
Economy,” Study Warns, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3068881/sharing-economy-taking-economy-uber-airbnb-data-
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 The individuals providing services through the platform companies are often called micro 
entrepreneurs. See Armitage, supra note 30, at 11; see also Andy Kessler, Brian Chesky: The 
‘Sharing Economy’ and Its Enemies, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014), 
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Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016); see also Keith 
Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern 
Economy, 19 B.U.L. REV. 1673 (2016). 
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 This distinction between employee and independent contractor remains controversial, and 
is currently the subject of considerable litigation with many of the platform companies. In the 
summer of 2017, Uber was embroiled in a costly class-action over fares with drivers. See 
David Streitfield, Uber Drivers Win Preliminary Class Action Status in Labor Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/business/uber-drivers-class-
action.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4RDM-VWUV]. 








The platform companies are able to collect considerable amounts of 
data on where and when the micro-entrepreneurs on their platforms are 
providing services.
246
 This data is valuable to regulators and other government 
officials as a means of understanding and predicting how to make their 
localities function better for their citizenry.
247
 As was made clear in the 
regulatory battles of Uber and Airbnb described in Part II, the platform 
companies are reluctant to share this data, claiming that the privacy of their 
users is at issue.
248
 As part of the settlements that Airbnb eventually reached 
with the state of New York and the city of San Francisco, the company agreed 
to share some of its data with regulators. Uber has agreed to share some 
aspects of its data, but not all.
249
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 In one nightmare-inducing story that made headlines, a home in Calgary Canada was 
destroyed after an Airbnb guest threw a party. Airbnb did not provide compensation to the 
hosts. Olivia Waxman, This House Was Totally Trashed After Being Rented on Airbnb, TIME 
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 Airbnb collects data from its hosts, but there is little published on the exact extent of that 
data collection. See Kim-Mai Cutler, Airbnb and the Problem of Data, TECHCRUNCH (June 
11, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/11/airbnb-and-the-problem-of-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/B8EZ-P5MM]. Uber also collects data from its riders and drivers, often 
through controversial programs. See supra text accompanying note 130; see also How Uber 
Uses Data to Improve Their Service and Create the New Wave of Mobility, KISSMETRICS, 
https://blog.kissmetrics.com/how-uber-uses-data/ [https://perma.cc/8S9E-ET3L].  
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Lawsuits with San Francisco, TECHCRUNCH (May 1, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/01/airbnb-settles-lawsuit-with-san-francisco/ 
[https://perma.cc/2VQ3-ABZB]. Uber has been sharing some traffic data with city planners 




 See supra text accompanying note 79 and citations referenced therein.  
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 While Uber’s open source data set will be valuable to urban planners (see Isaac, supra note 
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Miller, Uber and Lyft Resist California Regulators’ Appeal for Data Sharing, LEGAL TECH 
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In a design-thinking-based regulatory process, data sharing would no 
doubt be one of the aspects of the early solutions offered in return for 
regulations that enabled new innovative businesses to operate, both in beta-
testing phases as well as long-term. This kind of early collaboration would 
avoid the expenses wasted on confrontations that eventually resulted in 
exactly this sort of data-sharing, and could also address some of the privacy 
concerns that the micro-entrepreneurs have voiced in these battles.
250
 With 
early beta-testing data, both regulators and innovators would be better able to 
see how consumers, micro-entrepreneurs, and others were at risk from this 
new business, and could collaborate on how regulation could allocate or 
protect against those risks. 
 
4. To Platform Companies 
 
In Part II, we examined the costly battles Uber and Airbnb have waged 
around the world. In mid-2016 Uber was fighting more than 70 lawsuits in 
U.S. federal court.
251
 Those costs are likely to continue until Uber is more 
willing to compromise with regulators.
252
 In some cities—notably Vancouver 
and Austin—Uber has been banned for good.
253
 Airbnb has suffered a ban in 
the major market of New York and a faced legislative attack in San 
Francisco.
254
 Further, after spending countless hours and an exorbitant amount 
of money fighting required data-sharing with San Francisco regulators, Airbnb 
not only agreed to share data from its platform but also accepted the potential 
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 Marisa Kendall, Uber Battling More than 70 Lawsuits in Federal Courts, MERCURY NEWS 
(Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/07/04/uber-battling-more-than-70-
lawsuits-in-federal-courts/ [https://perma.cc/9CD7-2ZAT] (giving details of lawsuits and 
settlements in 2015–16). 
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 Id. (detailing antitrust claims against Uber in New York over price-fixing that could be 
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 Ryan Craggs, Where Uber is Banned Around the World, CONDÉ NAST TRAVELLER (Apr. 
15, 2017), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/where-uber-is-banned-around-the-world 
[perma.cc/M2DH-2UTP]; see also Nibler, supra note 162 (Uber banned from operating in 
London due to deceptive practices). 
254
 Craggs, supra note 253.  




for criminal liability should it fail to comply with regulation.
255
 Criminal 
liability was not mentioned prior to Airbnb’s resistance to San Francisco's 
2015 regulations that required data sharing. Arguably the city would not have 
created, nor Airbnb accepted, such a severe penalty if collaboration had begun 
earlier. 
The companies in our case study burned through investment dollars 
and revenue in their regulatory battles,
256
 were distracted from growing their 
businesses in competitive markets,
257
 and lost investor confidence—an 
important asset for a pre-IPO company.
258
 A design-thinking-based regulation 
process would make these harsh punitive measures (such as cease-and-desist 
letters, fines, and litigation) a final option instead of an initial contact, and 
would provide regulators with the most appropriate tools available to meet 
their goals. In addition, this process would allow platform companies to make 
functional changes to their products without public relations crises because 
regulators and innovators would convene regularly as markets and technology 
changed. 
A collaborative and iterative process that enables regulators and 
innovators to communicate often will slow punitive practices, since both 
regulators and innovators would have a better understanding of mutual 
expectations. We should not force innovators to conform to old rules written 
to apply to different ways of doing business—regulators must also innovate. 
In return, platform companies must be more collaborative. Innovators must 
recognize that regulators serve an important purpose, and that the safety of 
their cities should be their goal as well.
259
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The Benefits of a Design-Thinking-Based Regulatory Process 
  
The impact of regulatory capture and other barriers to entry created by 
traditional regulatory processes can be seen in both the taxi and the hotel 
industries. In the taxi industry, the practice of limiting the number of licensed 
drivers
260
 allowed demand to swell far past supply. This permitted taxi 
companies to get lazy and not innovate with new technology (no reason to 
create an expensive online demand system) or upgrade the rider experience 
(cars were dirty, drivers were rude, minority riders were routinely not picked 
up).
261
 This happened in cities around the country and created a pain point that 
the ride-sharing companies exploited to rapidly build a large user base. That 
large base was then used as leverage when state and local governments 
attempted to regulate the companies.
262
 
                                                                                                                               
thinking framework, regulators will function in entirely different roles and become active 
agents in their industries. Third, the possibility of regulatory capture in the design-thinking 
framework may remain; this is especially risky because regulators will spend more time 
interacting in preliminary phases with innovative new companies. See Armitage, supra note 
30. While design thinking may not be perfect, it may very well be a better system than what 
presently exists. Winston Churchill once conveyed a similar view of democratic government. 
Cf. Winston Churchill, Speech Before House of Commons 11/11/49, cited by World 
Association of International Study (WAIS) Forum on Democracy 
http://wais.stanford.edu/Democracy/democracy_DemocracyAndChurchill%28090503%29.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/ZW3J-JGRS] (quoting Winston Churchill’s famous admonition that “[i]t 
has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others that 
have been tried.”). 
260
 See Van Gelder, supra note 62. 
261
 See Downes, supra note 41 (“Look inside a typical taxicab today and you’ll find little in 
the way of technological sophistication. Just a meter (introduced in 1897), a two-way radio 
(circa 1940), and maybe a GPS device (not likely—after all, getting lost earns you more 
money).”). 
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2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/how-ubers-taxi-app-is-changing-
cities/281451/ [perma.cc/XN4B-KQUW] (describing a late-night attempt to pass a law to 
effectively ban Uber prompted a voracious social media response, including 37,000 tweets, 
which eventually defeated the so-called Uber Amendment); Airbnb has also used this 
technique, spending $8 million to defeat a proposition in San Francisco that would have 
restricted short-term rentals. See Alejandro Lazo, San Francisco Voters Reject Airbnb 
Initiative, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/san-francisco-voters-
reject-airbnb-initiative-1446622854. 




Similarly, the hotel industry complied with regulations to protect 
guests and employed union workers on their properties. This resulted in 
expensive rates that were acceptable in the world of business travelers, but 
ignored the desires and financial realities of those who wanted to travel for 
fun and adventure, who desired uniqueness in accommodations and could not 
or did not want to pay for the same room in the same hotel room everywhere 
they went. The hotel industry’s blindness to this type of user permitted the 
home-sharing companies to explode on the scene, offering a unique 
experience at any price.
263
 
Thus, the failure of various industries to accommodate users limits 
growth and innovation. Stagnant regulations then artificially protect 
companies from outside pressures that would otherwise force them to reinvent 
their business models as technology and populations change. Nevertheless, the 
importance of regulations cannot be denied. Without such protections, 
consumer harm is more likely. This is not just an abstract concept—harm 
occurs often when regulations don’t exist or are not sufficiently stringent. For 
example, lax regulations were largely blamed for the Grenfel Tower fire in 
London, where flammable materials were used as exterior siding, resulting in 
more than 70 deaths in a fire that quickly exploded out of control.
264
 In the 
ride-sharing space, the lack of adequate insurance was ignored until a little 
girl was run over by an Uber driver.
265
As a result of that accident, the 
California Department of Insurance worked with private insurance companies 
to develop a product that would cover a driver engaged in commercial 
activities. Airbnb had a similar issue when a guest trashed a host’s property 
before leaving and now guarantees hosts $1,000,000 in insurance to protect 
against such damage. These sorts of insurance policies might well have been 
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developed within a design-thinking collaborative process with all stakeholders 
contributing their expertise to foresee possible problems. 
These examples point out another issue with respect to the current 
regulatory regime. It is a reactive system in which regulators generally wait 
for a problem to arise before getting involved. The reactive deliberative 
process of traditional regulation may have been appropriate when product and 
service development cycles were slower and user uptake gradual. In such a 
system, regulators could be informed of problems before users were harmed. 
With fast-paced, innovative companies, regulators need to be educated and 
informed about what is taking place in the industries they regulate so that 
issues can be spotted in advance and dealt with in a timely and thorough 
manner. In order for that to happen, the regulatory process must be nimble, 
flexible and user-focused. In the past, that has not been the approach and it has 
led to much money, time, and effort being wasted by both regulators and 
entrepreneurs. However, with the future of driverless cars arriving quickly 
some regulators have adopted new procedures and proactively issued rules or 
at least principles to guide these cars as they are developed.
266
 Of course, 
more must be done to ensure that driverless cars and their passengers are safe 
on our roads, but there is hope for thinking that traditional patterns of 
regulation may be open to change when guidelines have been issued by the 
federal government as well as state government years before the products are 
ready to be launched publicly. 
A new regulatory process using design thinking to create new rules for 
an industry that is about to be disrupted would have many advantages. Any 
jurisdiction utilizing such an approach would have an advantage recruiting 
new companies to the area because founders would know that regulators want 
to find a way to support their businesses and that the municipality or region is 
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itself innovative and thus likely to be good place to launch new ideas.
267
 
Regulators would be happy with the process because they would not have to 
wait for a consumer harm or public outcry shaming their lack of effective 
response before being able to investigate the issue.
268
 Moreover, a pilot 
regulation designed by all stakeholders is likely to include more data and 
information so that a regulator would have ways to measure the impact of the 
rules. In this way, regulation will become performance-based and data-driven. 
Overall, the economy of the area would be more efficient, with less time and 
money spent on confrontation, with a level playing field for old and new 
companies in an industry, and with the private and public assets of the 
community better utilized. For these reasons, design thinking can produce a 
regulatory process that is a winning situation for everyone involved. 
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